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selected for contract award when they are an unsuccessful offeror. This thesis reviews the regulations
that cover debriefings, looks at the current debriefing process and recommends ways to improve
debriefings within Army Material Command.
A survey of contracting officers within Army Material Command and unsuccessful offerors that
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Competition requirements for defense procurement under
conditions that do not need a waiver require two or more
defense contractors to compete for contract award on a
solicitation [_4: p. 2] . The defense agency selects a winner or
winners of the competition and the other contractors are
unsuccessful offerors for that particular competition. When
price alone is not the only criteria used to determine
contract award the unsuccessful offerors may be very
interested to understand why they did not win the contract
award. By requesting a debriefing from the agency that is
responsible for the procurement, unsuccessful offerors can
obtain the information they need to determine why they lost
the procurement competition. The debriefing is a meeting
between representatives of the procuring agency and
unsuccessful company where agency representatives will explain
to the company why they did not win the contract award.
Unsuccessful offerors do not receive formal debriefings
for all defense procurement actions. Rather only one of the
two methods for federal procurement warrants a formal
debriefing [7_: p. 15-41]. The two possible methods of
procuring goods and services in federal procurement are sealed
bidding and negotiated procurement. The first method, sealed
bidding is to be used when (a) there is adequate time, (b)
contract award will be made based on price and price related
factors, (c) no discussions with offerors are needed, and (d)
there is an expectation of receiving bids from more than one
offeror [4: p.l] . The second method, competitive negotiation,
is to be used if the procurement doesn't meet the criteria of
sealed bidding.
The reason for contract award using sealed bidding is easy
to determine. The lowest priced bid from the offeror who is
both responsible and responsive wins the contract award
[9: p. 3-23]. Thus, unsuccessful offerors generally know
exactly why they didn't win the contract award and it is
normally because they didn't have the lowest priced bid.
For competitive negotiations the reason for not winning
contract award may not be so easy to determine. With the
advent of best value contracting, discovering the reasons for
not winning contract award may be further clouded from view.
This is because in this type of contracting, contract award is
made based on cost plus one or more other factors. Examples
of other factors could be technical solution, management
experience, past performance, and risk. In addition, the
factors are weighted in accordance with their importance to
the contract award. Once an evaluation is made and a winner
is selected, the unsuccessful offerors are notified that they
were not selected for contract award. With a multitude of
selection criteria and different weights used for each
criteria, unsuccessful offerors may have little idea why they
lost the contract award. It is no longer a case of realizing
that his cost was too high. It may be that his technical
solution, or management experience or some other factor or
combination of factors, when evaluated in accordance with the
evaluation criteria, were not as good as the winner's. The
unsuccessful offeror can request a debriefing from the agency
that is responsible for the procurement to find out what the
actual reasons are for him not being selected for contract
award
.
With the recent cuts in military procurement resulting
from the end of the cold war debriefings have increased in
importance for defense contractors as they fight for a piece
of the remaining procurement pie [12] . By understanding why
they lost one award, defense contractors can use the
information they obtained from a debriefing to increase their
competitive position for the next procurement.
Debriefings also have the potential to help the Department
of Defense (DOD) . From it's peak in fiscal year (FY) 1985 the
defense procurement budget will decrease approximately 65% to
a projected $43.3 billion for FY 1995 [8: p. 8]. Budget
constraints caused the Army alone to cut 57 procurement
programs and scale back on 77 others in FY 1993 [16: p. 10].
The dollars left for procurement must be wisely and
efficiently spent. Debriefings can be used to increase the
competitiveness of future procurements and thus allow DOD to
get more for each procurement dollar.
Debriefing unsuccessful offerors is not something new.
Debriefings were mentioned as far back as 1972 in the Report
of The Commission on Government Procurement, published in
December 1972 . Additionally, debrief ing unsuccessful of ferors
was required by the Defense Acquisition Regulation, in force
before the advent of the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR)
in 1984 [6: p.D. 15 . 10- 1] . The FAR states that debriefing of
unsuccessful offerors that request a debriefing is required
when a contract is awarded on the basis of other than price
alone [7: p. 15-41]. The FAR provides some general guidance
for the debriefings. This is as far as federal laws and
regulations go in covering the debriefing process. Army
regulations add little to what the federal regulations
stipulate. Details of who debriefs, when and where the
debriefing occurs, and the content of the debriefing are left
to a command's standard operating procedures or contracting
officers to decide.
B . OBJECTIVES
The objective of this Thesis is to examine the Army
Material Command's process of debriefing unsuccessful offerors
in contracts awarded on a basis of other than price alone.
The research is focused on what the current debriefing process
is, what problems there are with the current process, and what
can be done to improve the process
.
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS
The following research questions will be answered by the
Thesis
.
Primary: What are the key problems and issues associated
with the Army Material Command's process of debriefing
unsuccessful offerors and what can be done to improve the
process?
Subsidiary:




What are the problems associated with the Army
Material Command's current debriefing process from Army
Material Command's perspective?
3 What are the problems associated with Army Material
Command's current debriefing process from the unsuccessful
offerors perspective?
4. How can the debriefing process be modified to help
Army Material Command and the unsuccessful offerors?
D. SCOPE, LIMITATIONS, AND ASSUMPTIONS
1. Scope. This Thesis focuses on the debriefing of
unsuccessful offerors in Army Material Command (AMC) . It
covers all contracts awarded on a basis of other than price
alone. Five of the six major subordinate commodity commands
are studied. They include the Armament, Munitions and
Chemical Command, the Aviation rid Troop Command, the
Communications -Electronics Command, the Missile Command, and
the Tank -Automotive Command. The Chemical and Biological
Defense Command is not looked at as it recently reorganized
and just became part of AMC in 1993. Surveys and interviews
on the current process and how to improve it are directed to
Army Material Command contracting officials and defense
contractor contracting representatives who contract with AMC.
2. Limitations. The following limitations exist in the
thesis
.
a. Legislation on streamlining defense acquisition,
which includes a portion on debriefing unsuccessful offerors
is currently being discussed in Congress. Uncertainty as to
exactly what that legislation will be will exist until it is
passed, if it is passed.
b. Not all contracting officers within Army Material
Command and defense contractors that work with Army Material
Command were contacted. Additionally several were contacted
but did not respond to the survey or interview request.
Therefore there may be information useful to the thesis that
was not collected and thus not available for presentation and
analysis
.
3. Assumptions. The following assumptions were made in
this thesis.
a. The reader of the thesis has a general
understanding of Government contract administration.
b. Current regulations concerning debriefing of
unsuccessful offerors will remain in effect.
E. DEFINITIONS AND ABBREVIATIONS
1. AMC: Army Material Command. A major command in the
Army. AMC is responsible for developing, acquiring and
sustaining the material the Army needs to fight its wars. It
has many subordinate commands that perform specific missions.
2. AMCCOM: Armament, Munitions and Chemical Command. A
major subordinate command of AMC. AMCCOM is responsible for
the development, production and fielding of Army artillery,
mortars, rifles, rocket launchers, and aircraft and tank
armament. It is also responsible for acquiring all Army
ammunition.
3. ATCOM: Aviation and Troop Command. A major subordinate
command of AMC. ATCOM is responsible for overall acquisition
of all Army aviation assets and individual equipment for
soldiers, such as clothing, food and facilities.
4. CBDCOM: Chemical and Biological Defense Command. A
major subordinate command of AMC. It is responsible for
research, development, and production of biological and
chemical defense items.
5. CECOM: Communication- Electronics Command. A major
subordinate command of AMC. CECOM is responsible for the
overall acquisition of Army communications and electronic
equipment
.
6. MICOM: Missile Command. A major subordinate command of
AMC. MICOM acquires all Army tactical missiles and rockets.
7. MSC: Major subordinate command.
8. SSA: Source Selection Authority.
9. SSAC: Source Selection Advisory Council.
10. SSEB: Source Selection Evaluation Board.
11. TACOM: Tank-Automotive Command. A major subordinate
command of AMC. TACOM is responsible for the overall
acquisition of Army tanks, automotive ground vehicles,
construction equipment and material handling equipment.
F. ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY
Chapter II (background) discusses the following four major
areas. The organization of AMC and its MSCs; where debriefing
fits in the acquisition cycle; why debrief unsuccessful
offerors and the laws and regulations that pertain to
debriefing unsuccessful offerors.
Chapter III (research methodology) describes the
rationale behind the surveys and details the interviews.
Chapter IV (data presentation and analysis) presents a
summary of the surveys and analysis of the results, and
presents and analyzes the data collected from the interviews.
Chapter V (conclusions and recommendations) discusses the
conclusions that are made from the data collected and makes
recommendations for improving the current debriefing process.




This chapter will address the areas that the reader must
be familiar with in order to understand the specific
discussion on debriefing held in the later chapters. It will
discuss the laws and regulations that pertain to debriefing,
how debriefing fits in the source selection process, and the
reasons why debrief ings are conducted. This chapter will
also provide a description of AMC and show where contracting
officers fit in their organization.
B. LAWS AND REGULATIONS ON DEBRIEFING
I . Laws
Title 10 of the United States Code contains the laws
which pertain to negotiated procurement for the military.
Currently there is no legislation contained in Title 10 that
pertains to debriefing of unsuccessful offerors. Title 10
mentions only that unsuccessful offerors be notified promptly
once contract award has been made. This was added to Title 10
in 1988. [23: sec. 2305] This is not to say that Congress is
not interested in debriefing or hasn't discussed it. Rather,
the recommendation to pass legislation concerning debriefing
has been brought up several times. It is discussed in the
Report of the Commission on Federal Procurement, published in
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December 1972, surfaced again in 1991 when both houses of
Congress proposed legislation that covered debriefing, and
appeared again in 1993 as part of the Section 800 Panel Report
that went to Congress.
a. Report of the Commission on Government
Procuremen
t
The Report of the Commission on Government
Procurement was conducted in 19 72 by a commission appointed by-
Congress and the Executive Branch. It consisted of two
members each from the Senate, House of Representatives, and
Executive Branch, one member from the Comptroller General, and
five members from the public sector. It was commissioned in
response to a concern over the manner in which the federal
procurement process operated and over the deficiencies in the
system [18: p.l]. It was a full scale study of the entire
federal procurement process and recommended to Congress
methods to increase the economy, efficiency, and effectiveness
of the procurement process. One of those recommendations was
on post -award policy and pertained to debriefing of
unsuccessful offerors. The recommendation was that:
When competitive procedures that do not involve formal
advertising are utilized, establish that agencies shall
upon written request of an unsuccessful proposer,
effectively communicate the reasons for selecting a
proposal other than his own. [1_8: p. 25]
The report's reasons for the recommendation was that there
were no laws requiring communication with unsuccessful
offerors to explain why their proposals were not as
11
advantageous to the Government as the winning offeror's.
Letting an unsuccessful offeror know why his proposal was not
as strong as the winner's allowed the offeror to improve and
be more competitive in the future. Debriefing, the report
explained, improves the confidence of offerors as they realize
the procurement rules are being followed and applied fairly.
Unsuccessful offerors thought they should be given information
to understand the value of their proposals [18.: p. 25] . When
not given this information, protests and informal complaints
were used to gain access to information as to why their
proposal wasn't selected [18.: p. 25]. Finally, the commission
thought that by passing legislation requiring debriefing, the
Government would get better proposals and have more
credibility with competing contractors. Although the
commission made a good case for legislation concerning
debriefing of unsuccessful offerors, Congress did not come
through with any appropriate legislation.
b. H.R. 3161
In 1991 the House of Representatives proposed a
resolution to amend laws pertaining to federal procurement.
The resolution, H.R. 3161, included a portion on the
debriefing of unsuccessful offerors. The portion of the bill
was introduced over concern that insufficient debriefings may
actually increase award protests. [10: p. 35] Offerors unsure
of the fairness of the award decision or those just wanting to
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know the reasons why they did not win contract award could use
a protest as a tool to find out what an adequate debriefing
would have provided. The bill was specific in regard to what
should be covered by statute. The proposed amendment
contained five sections:
(a) When a contract is awarded on a basis other than price
alone, unsuccessful offerors, upon their written request,
shall be debriefed and furnished the basis for the
selection decision and contract award.
(b) In any procurement for a contract for an amount
greater than $5,000,000, a debriefing under subsection (a)
shall provide to the offeror requesting the debriefing, at
least the following information if disclosure of such
information would not compromise confidential business
information of the awardee:
(1) the basic proposed technical solution or
configuration of the awardee;
(2) the overall evaluated cost of the awardee and of
the debriefed offeror;
(3) the cost or price associated with the major
components of the awardee' s proposal, including line item
pricing if practicable;
(4) the overall ranking of the awardee and the
debriefed offeror, and the combined technical and cost
scores of the awardee and the debriefed offeror;
(5) the technical point scores of the awardee and the
debriefed offeror on the factors and sub- factors
identified in the solicitation;
(6) a description of the rational for the award; and
(7) reasonable responses to questions posed by the
debriefed offeror as to whether source selection
procedures set forth in the solicitation, the source
selection plan, applicable regulations, and other
applicable authorities were followed by the Government.
(c) Each solicitation for a contract greater than
$5,000,000 shall notify participating offerors that the
categories of information described in subsection (b) may
be disclosed by the Government in post-award briefings.
(d) The failure of any agency to provide a debriefing
satisfying the requirements of subsection (b) shall be a
matter subject to protest to any forum having jurisdiction
over protests relating to the procurement, and the protest
forum, in its discretion, may order appropriate relief in
any such protest.
(e) In any case in which a debriefing is conducted under
this section and the procurement subsequently is resumed
13
as a result of a successful protest against award or other
reason, the contracting officer shall provide to each
competing contractor all information subject to disclosure
under this section that is necessary to ensure equity and
fair competition in the resumed procurement." [10: p. 15]
This bill proposed not only that debriefings be
conducted by federal agencies but provided a detailed
framework for what should be included in those debriefings.
This framework went far beyond what the current regulations
require for debriefings. Debriefings based on this outline
would no doubt reduce the lingering questions left in
unsuccessful offerors minds as to why they didn't win a
contract award. This outline was never put to use however as
the bill did not pass into law.
c. S. 1958
The Senate introduced a bill in 1991 that was
similar to the House's H.R. 3161. It was S. 1958. The bill
had four main goals, one of which was the establishment of a
meaningful debriefing for unsuccessful offerors [19.: p. 3].
The Senate bill added a requirement that H.R. 3161 did not
contain. A request for a debriefing covered under the Senate
bill must be made within ten days after contract award and the
debriefing must take place within ten days of the request
[19 : p. 18]. The Senate cited the need for legislation on
debriefings as a result of debriefings being inconsistently
given and even when given, many times failing to meet the
objective of conducting them [19: p. 9]. Additionally, the
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Senate conceded that by requiring meaningful debrief ings, the
number of protests filed as a result of no debrief ings or poor
debriefings would drop [19: p. 10]. Thus, the cost and time
lost due to a protest could be avoided by a proper debriefing.
Industry officials stated at the Senate hearings that federal
agencies were not providing useful information regarding the
reasons for award to the winner and non- award to the
unsuccessful offerors. They further stated that many times
protests were used to obtain the information they could not
get at the debriefing [19.: p. 9] . The Government Accounting
Office confirmed all of this [19: p. 9] . As was the case with
H.R. 3161 though, S. 1958 was not passed and no legislation on
debriefing unsuccessful offerors resulted from either bill.
d. Section 800 Panel Report
In the National Defense Authorization Act of FY
1991 Congress directed DOD to establish an advisory panel of
Government and industry experts to review all laws affecting
DOD procurement . The panel was to submit a report through the
Secretary of Defense in January 19 9 3 that made recommendations
to streamline defense acquisition. The report submitted to
Congress is commonly referred to as the Section 800 Panel
Report. One of the recommendations that the panel submitted
was an amendment for section 2305(b) (4) (B) of Title 10 of the
United States Code requiring regulations that address
debriefing unsuccessful offerors [25: p. 1-4]. The panel's
15
recommendation was based on the American Bar Association's
19 89 Report on Bid Protests which found that prompt and
meaningful debrief ings help stem the tide of protests. The
Bar Association report contained the results of a survey taken
of protestors and their lawyers. The results showed that a
number of protests could be avoided if timely and meaningful
debrief ings were conducted. [25.: p. 1-232] These debrief ings
would show that the procurement was done properly and would
provide information why the unsuccessful offeror was not
selected for contract award.
The Section 800 Panel thought that any statute
concerning debriefing unsuccessful offerors should cover
general policy objectives while the regulations should cover
the details. The panel recommended that the statute require
three things of the regulations. First, the regulations
should set up criteria for determining when a debriefing is
required. The panel recognized that debrief ings are not
essential for such actions as small purchases, and procurement
actions where there are no significant evaluation areas other
than cost. Next the panel believed that regulations must be
required to ensure that debrief ings be held within 15 calendar
days after award, whenever possible. The panel believed that
the more timely a debrief is held the less likely it was that
a protest would be filed. Lastly, the panel believed the
regulations must require the debriefing to include the
strengths and weaknesses of the unsuccessful offeror's
16
proposal. By providing strengths and weaknesses the panel
thought an unsuccessful offeror would better understand why he
was not the winner and would thus be less inclined to file a
protest. [25: p. 1-69] The outcome of the Section 800 Report
and it's recommendations on debriefing are yet to be
determined. The report was presented to Congress in October
1993 and is still being discussed.
e. Federal Acquisition Regulation
The Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) is a set
of regulations that cover the acquisition of all goods and
services for all federal agencies. The FAR covers debriefing
of unsuccessful offerors in 15.1003 which provides that:
(a) When a contract is awarded on the basis of other than
price alone, unsuccessful offerors, upon their written
request, shall be debriefed as soon as possible and
furnished the basis for the selection decision and
contract award.
(b) Debriefing information shall include the Government's
evaluation of the significant weak or deficient factors in
the proposal; however, point -by-point comparisons with
other offerors' proposals shall not be made. Debriefing
shall not reveal the relative merits or technical standing
of competitors or the evaluation scoring. Moreover,
debriefing shall not reveal any information that is not




(2) Privileged or confidential manufacturing processes
and techniques; and
(3) Commercial and financial information that is
privileged or confidential, including cost breakdowns,
profit, indirect cost rates, and similar information.
(c) The contracting officer shall include a summary of the
debriefing in the contract file. [7: p. 15-41]
It is important to note what information the FAR
allows the debriefing agency to release. Companies that
17
request debriefings are generally looking for as much
information as possible to explain why their proposals were
not selected for contract award. The FAR does allow general
comparisons to be made between proposals. However, the
debriefing will not cover the relative merits or technical
standing of competitors or the evaluation scoring. [7: p. 15-
41] A definition of relative merits, technical standing and
evaluation standing is needed as these terms can be
interpreted differently by different people. Dr. David Lamm
of the Naval Postgraduate School describes what these three
terms mean. Relative merits refer to the approaches taken by
an offeror in his attempt to satisfy the evaluation criteria
of the RFP. This includes the evaluated quality of those
approaches. Technical standing is the ranking of the
technical area or areas with respect to other offerors. It
could be in the form of scores or numerical ranking. Lastly,
evaluation scoring is the numerical score given to each area
and total numerical score of all areas. [11] Thus, the FAR
emphasizes the discussion be on the debriefed offeror's
proposal and discourages any discussion on other competitor's
proposals
.
f. Army FAR Supplement
The Army FAR Supplement (AFARS) provides
additional guidance to AMC for debriefing unsuccessful
offerors. It consists of three sections which provide that:
18
a. The contracting officer will release to unsuccessful
offerors the required information as prescribed in FAR
15.1001.
b. When debriefings are requested they shall be in
accordance with FAR 15.1003.
(1) Debriefings will be with only one offeror at a time
and will not be conducted until after contract award.
(2) The debriefing must be confined to a discussion of
the offeror's proposal and its advantages and
disadvantages in relation to the requirements of the RFP.
Comparisons should not be made relative to the proposal of
other offerors.
(3) No information will be disclosed to an offeror as
to the weights or ratings assigned.
c. Normally, the debriefings should be conducted by or
under the direction of the contracting officer. It should
be noted that some contractors may wish to discuss the
outcome at higher levels of authority. Although this
should not be encouraged, neither should barriers be
placed in their way of getting an explanation from
responsible officials. [1: p. 10-3]
This places further restrictions on the debriefing
process. Of particular note is that the AFARS prevents
general comparisons with other offerors' proposals even though
such comparisons are allowed by the FAR. The AFARS also
states that debriefings should be limited to the offeror's
proposal. This prevents any discussion of the winning
offeror's proposal. However, the agency that wrote this
guidance stated that each debriefing should be treated on a
case by case basis and that contracting commands have the
latitude to deviate from this guidance. The reason this
guidance was written was that there had been problems with
unsuccessful offerors getting some information on the winner's
proposal evaluation and then trying to re -engineer the source
selection evaluation process. With the limited information
that some unsuccessful offerors received they were sometimes
19
coming up with the conclusion that they couldn't have lost the
procurement competition and then protested the procurement.
The unsuccessful offeror will never understand the complete
selection process because proprietary business data cannot be
released. Therefore he will never have a complete picture of
the source selection process. [20.] Additionally, the AFARS
stipulates that contracting officers debrief one offeror at
a time and only after contract award. The AFARS highlights
the contracting officer's role as the official interface
between his command and the defense contractor and it requires
that the debriefing should be conducted or directed by him.
g. AMC-P 715-3 Vol. 1
AMC has it's own publication which discusses
source selection and it contains a section on debriefing.
AMC-P 715-3, Vol. 1 reiterates the same guidance that the
AFARS provides except it adds that
:
. . . normally the Debrief ings should be conducted by or
under the direction of the [contracting officer] , although
the manner in which debriefings are to be handled is
discretionary with the SSA. [2: p. 51]
This reinforces the role the SSA has in the source selection
process to include the last communications with the
unsuccessful offerors, that of the debriefing. The SSA can
influence the debriefing in ways the contracting officer
cannot. The SSA can provide resources for the debriefing that
may not be available without his help. This is especially
20
true for SSEB members who can improve the debriefing by-
participating in it.
C. WHY DEBRIEF UNSUCCESSFUL OFFERORS
There are several reasons why the Army should debrief
unsuccessful offerors. The first reason is because it is
required. The FAR states that when a contract is awarded on
a basis of other than price alone unsuccessful offerors will,
upon written request, be debriefed as soon as possible and be
provided the basis for the selection decision [7: p. 15-41].
The FAR makes no mention of the size or complexity thresholds
that need to be met before debrief ings will be held. It
merely states that if one or more factors, other than price,
is used to determine the source selection, then unsuccessful
offerors are entitled to a debriefing when they ask for one in
writing. Thus, all federal agencies are required to debrief
all unsuccessful offerors that request a debriefing in
writing.
Another reason to debrief is to help improve the future
competitiveness of the unsuccessful offeror. By providing the
unsuccessful offerors with the rationale behind why they
weren't selected for contract award they will be able to
submit better proposals for future contracts [17: p. 528].
Commenting on all evaluated areas and identifying strengths
and weaknesses of the offeror's proposal will allow him to
capitalize on his strong areas and improve on his weaknesses
21
for future proposals. This should improve his competitiveness
for any subsequent solicitations he responds to. Without this
explanation the unsuccessful offeror may make false
assumptions about what improvements he needs to make and thus
may continue to commit the same costly errors on future
proposals. Improving his competitive position also helps the
buyer as it receives a more competitive proposal in future
procurements
.
Fairness is another reason why the unsuccessful offeror
should be debriefed [3.: p.l] . The contractor worked hard on
getting his proposal done and spent precious company resources
in the process. For large solicitations his best efforts to
win the contract award may result in months of work and
hundreds of thousands of dollars spent preparing a proposal.
The interests of fairness dictate that the contractor get some
feedback as to why he wasn't selected for contract award. It
is only fair that federal agencies respond to the contractors
efforts and spend some time explaining how they evaluated the
proposal
.
Next, debrief ings can show unsuccessful offerors that the
source selection decision was rational and conformed to the
requirements and evaluation criteria set out in the RFP
[17: p. 528] . With no feedback the unsuccessful offeror would
less likely know for sure if the source selection was based
solely on the evaluation criteria in the RFP and if the
evaluation board used the criteria in a logical way to
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evaluate it's proposal. By providing a debriefing the
unsuccessful offeror can see that the evaluation committee did
indeed use all the criteria identified in the RFP and
evaluated each area in accordance with the standards set forth
for each area.
Lastly, by providing a debriefing contracting officials
should reduce the possibility of protests being filed which
could delay the procurement [3.: p.l] . By placing their "cards
on the table" unsuccessful offerors can see that the contract
agency has nothing to hide and is acting in good faith.
Additionally, they could get the information they are looking
for to find out why they lost without having to file a
protest. Thus, a protest would less likely be filed as a
result of providing a debriefing. This is the reason the
Section 800 Panel cited as it's basis for requiring
debrief ings
.
D. WHERE DEBRIEFING FITS IN THE SOURCE SELECTION PROCESS
The debriefing process fits in near the end of the source
selection process but is not an isolated event. Rather, all
steps in the process have some effect on the debriefing of
unsuccessful offerors.
The source selection process begins with the development
of the source selection plan (SSP) , which is normally
comprised of two parts dealing with the source selection team
membership and the evaluation criteria. The first part covers
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the details of the organization, membership and
responsibilities of the source selection party. It describes
who is on the Source Selection Advisory Council (SSAC) and
Source Selection Evaluation Board (SSEB) , if it is used. The
advisory council's role is to advise the SSA on the source
selection process and actual source selection. The SSA is the
person who is responsible for the entire source selection
process. Two of his important duties are to ensure the source
selection plan is properly written and executed and to select
the winning proposal based on the information the SSEB and
SSAC give him [5: p.lO-B-2]. The SSAC may provide the SSA
with a comparative analysis of the evaluation results. Care
must be taken to select personnel for the advisory council who
have the appropriate skills and experience to properly advise
the SSA. The SSEB is responsible to evaluate all proposals in
accordance with the evaluation criteria set in the SSP and
RFP. The SSEB members must have the proper experience and
expertise to fully understand the evaluation criteria and make
competent evaluations of proposals in accordance with those
criteria. Selection of the right people to fill these
positions will result in the thorough evaluation of each
proposal and the proper results given to the SSA. This in
turn will result in the correct proposal receiving contract
award and meaningful comments on the strengths and weaknesses
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of all other proposals for debriefing of unsuccessful
offerors
.
The second part of the source selection plan covers the
evaluation criteria. The SSA and SSAC are responsible for the
development and weighting of the evaluation criteria. The
criteria are used by the SSEB to evaluate each proposal. All
proposals are evaluated in the same manner to ensure a
consistent process. The evaluation criteria must be selected
and written to ensure the Government gets the product that
best meets the solicitation and statement of work.
Establishing a method to evaluate each criteria is extremely
important as it serves as the basis for the evaluation and
justification of each rating. Evaluation criteria are to be
measured quantitatively and qualitatively and must be written
as such. There should be a standard against which each
criteria can be judged. Additionally, the evaluation criteria
must be properly weighted to reflect the relative importance
of each criteria as determined by the SSA and SSAC.
Incomplete or poorly worded criteria or improperly weighted
evaluation criteria can result in an inaccurate assessment of
proposals. Problems with source selection and subsequent
debrief ings would then follow. Narrative comments extracted
from the evaluation for use in a debriefing may then be
incorrect, misleading or incomplete. This results in a
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debriefing that is inaccurate or lacks any specifics. These
narrative comments are crucial to a successful debriefing.
They provide the concise information unsuccessful offerors
need to understand what their strengths and weaknesses were in
each area. Establishing comprehensive and accurate standards
for evaluation criteria and weighting them properly will
prevent any problems evaluating proposals and instead yield
correct and meaningful evaluations and comments that can be
used to make a correct source selection and improve the
debriefing.
Next, a competitive range is determined. This is normally
determined by the contracting officer and approved by the SSA.
Three areas are looked at when evaluating proposals to
determine if they are in the competitive range. First, the
proposal must be determined to be responsive. In the terms of
negotiated procurement the proposal is considered to be
responsive unless the offeror refuses to comply with any of
the requirements of the RFP. The other two areas to be looked
at are the technical merits and cost of the proposal.
Proposals are to be deemed in the competitive range with
regard to these two areas as long as there is a possibility
that the proposal can win the contract award [9: p.4-9] . When
a proposal falls out of the competitive range the offeror is
notified. Debrief ings resulting from being excluded from the
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competitive range may not be as detailed as debriefings given
to offerors who make it all the way through to best and final
offers (BAFO's) . A comprehensive evaluation may not have been
needed to determine the proposal was outside the competitive
range. Discussions are held with those offerors in the
competitive range. Meaningful discussions should have a
direct impact on the debriefing of unsuccessful offerors.
Meaningful discussions will identify any deficient areas in a
proposal and help clarify any questions the evaluation team
has with respect to the proposal . This allows the contractor
to make modifications to his proposal to increase it's
competitiveness. Additionally, productive discussions should
head off any surprises in the debriefing regarding weak areas
in the proposal as these weaknesses would have already been
identified and then addressed by the offeror.
BAFO's are received after discussions are concluded. At
this time all offerors still in the competitive range may
submit final changes to their proposals and make a final
offer. A final evaluation is done on all those still in the
competition. BAFO's may change the evaluation of those areas
amended and thus influence the award and subsequent
debriefing comments of those areas.
Next, a source selection decision is made, contract award
is completed and unsuccessful offerors are notified.
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Information given out during notification includes the number
of RFP's sent out and proposals received, the contract price,
and, in general terms, the reason why the offeror's proposal
was not the winning proposal [7: p. 15-41] This concludes the
source selection team's interaction with the unsuccessful
offeror, unless they take part in the debriefing or a protest
is filed.
For solicitations that do not require a formal source
selection team the contracting officer plays a bigger role in
the process. Evaluation criteria may be written by the
contracting officer and a technical and cost analyst. The
proposal evaluations may be done solely by the contracting
officer or may involve a small team of evaluators, such as a
technical evaluator and cost analyst. Even though the process
is smaller and less complicated the impact that each part of
the source selection process has on debriefing unsuccessful
offerors is the same.
E. ARMY MATERIAL COMMAND
AMC is an Army major command headed by a four star
general. It's basic mission is to develop, buy and maintain
material for the Army [24: p. 2] . It is composed of depots,
laboratories, arsenals, manufacturing and maintenance
facilities, proving grounds, test ranges, and buying offices.
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There are currently six commodity commands and four functional
commands within AMC. These units are responsible for the
research, development, testing, acquisition, and maintenance
of the Army's material resources.
1. Functional Commands
The four functional commands include the Army Research
Laboratory (ARL) , the Depot System Command (DESCOM) , the
Simulation Training and Instrumentation Command (STRICOM) , and
the Test and Evaluation Command (TECOM)
.
a. ARL
The ARL is a command composed of research centers
that generate new technologies and advanced concepts for all
existing and future Army equipment.
b. DESCOM
DESCOM is responsible for the operation of the
Army's depots. The depots receive, store, issue, perform
maintenance on and dispose of Army equipment
.
c. STRICOM
STRICOM' s mission is to manage and direct the
Army's simulation, training and test instrumentation needs.
In addition it does the same for the new Distributed
Interactive Simulation technology that the Army is using.
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d. TECOM
TECOM is the command responsible for the planning
and test and evaluation of the Army's equipment. This
includes managing all testing facilities and equipment.
2. Commodity Commands
The six commodity commands include the Armament,
Munitions, and Chemical Command (AMCCOM) , the Aviation and
Troop Command (ATCOM) , the Communications -Electronics Command
(CECOM) , the Missile Command (MICOM) , the Tank-Automotive
Command (TACOM) , and the Chemical and Biological Defense
Command (CBDCOM) . Each of these MSC's provide research and
development, engineering, procurement, and logistics support
to their commodity areas. Additionally they provide matrix
support to the Program Executive Officers of their respective
commodity areas. These MSC's do almost all of the acquisition
actions within AMC. Together they spent over 95 percent of
AMC's acquisition dollars in 1993 [15].
a . AMCCOM
AMCCOM is responsible for armament, ammunition and
chemical defense equipment. Armament includes towed and self
propelled artillery, aircraft and tank armament, mortars, fire
control systems, gun- type air defense weapons, and infantry
weapons. Ammunition includes all ordnance for weapons systems
from small arms infantry weapons to large artillery and tank
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rounds. Other items include bombs, rocket and missile
warheads, fuzes, mines, grenades, pyrotechnics, smoke, and
incendiary devices. The AMCCOM organization includes the
Research, Development and Engineering Center, three arsenals,
15 active ammunition plants, and Acquisition Center.
b. ATCOM
ATCOM is responsible for aviation assets and troop
support items. Aviation assets include Army aircraft,
aircraft engines, spare parts, air traffic control hardware
and aviation ground support equipment. Troop support items
include all clothing and protective clothing items, footwear,
food, food service equipment, water supply equipment,
petroleum distribution equipment, all aerial delivery systems
such as parachutes and slings, generators, Army watercraft,
and rail and bridging equipment. Major activities in ATCOM
include three research, development and engineering centers,
a weapon system management center, an integrated material
management center and an acquisition center.
C CBDCOM
CBDCOM is responsible for the commodity management
of all chemical and biological related items. This includes
protective suits, footwear and masks, detecting and monitoring
equipment, and decontamination equipment and materials. Major
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elements of CBDCOM are a research, development and engineering
center and acquisition center.
d. CECOM
CECOM is responsible for all Army communications
and electronics equipment. Items include radios and radio
related equipment, electronic warfare items, photographic
equipment, radars, automated data processing and management
information systems items, batteries, ground and airborne
surveillance items, night vision equipment, and satellite
systems. Major activities of CECOM include the Research,
Development and Engineering Center, the Command, Control,
Communications, and Intelligence Logistics and Readiness




MICOM is responsible for all equipment related to
rocket and missile systems. This includes all components and
subsystems related to air-to-ground missile systems, surface-
to-surface missile systems, surface-to-air missile systems,
ballistic missiles, and anti-armor missile systems. Major
units in MICOM include a research, development and engineering




TACOM is responsible for commodity management of
all combat and tactical vehicles. This includes tanks, all
carriers to include those for personnel, cargo, and missile,
self propelled artillery vehicles, wheeled vehicles, special
purpose equipment, trailers, construction equipment, and
materials handling equipment. Major elements of TACOM are the
Research, Development and Engineering Center, Integrated
Material Management Center, Weapon Systems Management Center,
and Acquisition Center.
F. CONTRACTING OFFICERS IN THEIR ORGANIZATION
The AMC MSC's are each composed of several major centers.
Centers common to the MSC's include the Research, Development,
and Engineering Center, the Integrated Material Management or
Logistics Center, and the Acquisition Center. The
contracting officers that procure equipment and services are
located in the Contract Operations Directorate of the
Acquisition Center. The Acquisition Center is composed of
several directorates. These are the Contract Operations,
Acquisition Policy, Production Management, and Quality
Management Directorates. The Contract Operations Directorate
is split up into sections by commodity line and contracting
officers are assigned to each section.
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G. SUMMARY
This chapter identified the laws and regulations that
cover debriefing unsuccessful offerors, the reasons to
debrief, where debriefing fits in the source selection
process, what AMC is, and where contracting officers fit in
their organization. An understanding of these topics will
allow the reader to better understand how debriefing




The methods used in the Thesis to collect information and
data include a literature review, two survey questionnaires,
and personal interviews. The literature search was done first
to collect written material concerning debriefing unsuccessful
offerors. This material and a personal interview with a
Principle Assistant Responsible for Contracting (PARC) were
used to develop the two survey questionnaires. Next, surveys
were sent out to collect data concerning the debriefing
process. One survey was developed for defense contractors.
The other was written for AMC contracting officers. The two
surveys were very similar in nature and were geared to illicit
responses to almost identical questions from the two sides
participating in a debriefing. Personal interviews were
conducted with defense contracting officials to verify the
results of the survey and as a follow up to problem areas
identified in the surveys that warranted further exploration.
Finally, personal interviews were done with AMC contracting
officers. These were done to verify survey results and to
respond to potential solutions to problem areas that were
identified in the preceding stages.
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B. LITERATURE SEARCH
Literature research provided a background of information
on debriefing. This information was then used as a framework
for the rest of the thesis research. It was used to develop
the surveys and personal interview questions. Literature
research started with a search of the Naval Postgraduate
School Library, Stanford Business School Library, the Defense
Logistics Information Exchange, and Defense Technical
Information Center. No major publications on debriefing were
found as a result of this search. Instead, several works had
small sections that pertained to debriefing. This provided
only a small amount of information concerning debriefing.
Next, a search was done on Government publications and
Congressional documents. This search resulted in two
Government documents that discussed debriefing procedures.
These are the Report of the Commission on Government
Procurement
. and Streamlining Acquisition Laws . Additionally,
two Congressional reports were found. They are H.R. 3161, and
S. 1958, which both represent Congressional attempts to pass
legislation on the debriefing process. Lastly, the FAR and
DOD regulations and instructions that pertained to debriefing
unsuccessful offerors were collected. This provided the





Two survey questionnaires were designed and utilized
to gather data on AMC's debriefing procedures. One survey was
constructed for defense contractors and the other for AMC
contracting officials.
2 . Target Audience
a. Defense Contractor Survey
The target audience for the survey for defense
contractors was a broad cross -section of defense contractors
that contract with AMC. This selection of defense contractors
included large companies, small companies, small and
disadvantaged companies, service companies, engineering
companies, hardware companies, and software companies.
Additionally, the selection of companies was done to ensure
that all AMC MSC's were represented in the survey target
audience.
The companies were selected from a list of defense
contractors that appeared in the May/June 1993 edition of
National Defense magazine. Several small companies, and small
and disadvantaged companies were also selected from the MICOM
source solicitation mailing list to ensure an adequate
representation of these companies. Initially, a list of
companies to send surveys to was being compiled by calling AMC
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MSC's and asking for names of companies that were recent
unsuccessful offerors. However this method was abandoned
because of a concern that the MSC's may have been providing
names of "happy" unsuccessful offerors and not giving names of
companies that were "unhappy" with the debriefing they
received. This method of developing a survey mailing list
would most likely have resulted in skewed survey results by
understating any problems with the debriefing process.
Therefore, the author used the National Defense magazine list
of defense contractors, supplemented by the MICOM source
solicitation mailing list to get a random list of defense
contractors. This would result in more objective survey
results
.
Surveys were sent to the director of contracts of
each company. Instructions on the survey requested that
personnel familiar with debriefings from officials within AMC
and who received a debriefing from an AMC MSC within the last
five years complete the survey. Surveys were sent to 76
companies with a total of 204 surveys being mailed. Each
company was sent at least two surveys. Ten companies were
contacted by phone before surveys were sent to them to ensure
that the surveys would be answered and returned. This was
done to ensure a sample of surveys mailed would be returned
for analysis. These companies indicated the number of surveys
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that they wanted mailed to them. Of the 204 surveys mailed
out, 41 were answered and returned, another 15 surveys were
returned that were not answered with an explanation that the
company either had not had a debriefing from an official
within AMC within the last five years or they had not bid on
any AMC contracts within the last five years. The goal for
the number of completed surveys to be returned was 30. This
is the number of samples needed to approximate the mean of the
entire survey population according to statistics textbooks
[2_6: p. 298] . Even though statistical analysis was not the
design of this survey, enough survey results were desired to
ensure an approximation of results that the entire population
of defense contractors that contract with AMC would have
yielded.
Jb. AMC Contracting Officer Survey
The target audience for the AMC contracting
officer survey was contracting officials within the AMC
commodity commands that conduct debriefings for unsuccessful
offerors. AMC MSC's were contacted and Acquisition Center
Chiefs and Directorate Chiefs provided the names of
contracting officers within each command that conduct
debriefings. A representative sample of contracting officials
was provided for each of the five MSC's studied in this
thesis. Surveys were sent to the 42 contracting officials who
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names were provided by their MSC. Responses were received
from 32 officials. The goal was to get 3 responses.
3 . Survey Design
The two surveys are almost identical in nature as all
but three questions are the same. The surveys were designed
to provide data on the respondent's views of the AMC
debriefing process. This two survey method is being used to
compare answers between the two groups to see where
similarities and differences in opinion exist. They were
tailored to yield sufficient information on the debriefing
process while at the same time being short enough to ensure an
adequate number of surveys were completed and returned. A
copy of each survey appears in the appendix. The surveys have
two major types of questions. The first type consists of
multiple choice and specific fill in the blank questions and
the second type consists of general open ended questions on
the overall debriefing process.
The first type of questions was designed to get
responses to specific questions on the debriefing process.
The defense contractor survey consists of 22 multiple choice
questions and two specific fill in the blank questions. The
Survey for AMC officials has 21 multiple choice questions and
three specific fill in the blank questions. Possible answers
on the multiple choice questions range from two to four with
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the exception of one question which had six possible answers.
These possible answers were chosen in order to categorize
responses to aid in analyzing the survey data. The multiple
choice questions each have a blank space for respondents to
amplify their answers or make any comments in reference to the
questions or their answers. The comments were to be used to
aid in analyzing the answers and to see if any comments
appeared repeatedly throughout the returned surveys
.
The second type of questions consisted of open ended
questions. The defense contractor survey had five open ended
questions while the AMC survey had four. The objective of
using these questions was to illicit responses about the
overall debriefing process and allow the respondents to make
any comments they want to about the debriefing process in an
attempt to get responses not covered in the first type of
questions. These questions focus on the strengths and
weaknesses of the debriefing process and how the process can
be improved. These comments were used in an attempt to
capitalize on the strengths of the process and find ways to
overcome the weaknesses identified.
D
. INTERVIEWS
Interviews were conducted with both defense contractor
representatives and AMC contracting officials. The intent of
41
the interviews was to follow up on recurrent answers or
comments from the surveys and to identify other areas of the
debriefing process that could be improved. Interviews of
defense contractors were conducted within the broad cross-
section of companies that contract with AMC. This includes
large and small businesses, hardware producers, and a services
company. Interviews were conducted first with the defense
contractors. This was done so that information on areas that
needed improvement and their possible solutions could be
collected and then presented to AMC contracting officials.
These officials could then comment on the identified areas and
feasibility of the possible solutions. Additionally, they
could address any areas they wanted to and present possible
solutions to any weak areas of the debriefing process.
Interviews were conducted with contracting officers from three
of the five MSC's that were surveyed.
All interviews are recorded as anonymous entries in the
thesis. This was done to ensure more complete and honest
comments would be obtained by not identifying the source of
the comments. This avoids the concern on the part of
interview participants that their comments could be viewed
negatively by any others in the AMC procurement system.
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E. SUMMARY
This chapter outlined the methods of research used in the
thesis. They include a literature search, survey
questionnaires, and interviews. It identified the purpose for
each method. The target audience and survey design for the
survey questionnaires are fully explained. Lastly, details of
how the interviews were done was covered. Chapter IV will
present and analyze the data obtained from the surveys and
interviews.
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IV. DATA PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS
A. GENERAL
This chapter contains the data presentation and analysis.
It contains two major sections. The first is data
presentation and analysis for the survey questionnaires sent
out and the second covers interview comments and analysis of
these comments.
B. SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRES
The questions are discussed as they appear on each of the
surveys. A discussion of the answers and an analysis of the
answers follow. The questions from the two surveys that are
similar are presented and analyzed together.
1. Question 1 The intent of this question is to
determine what percent of unsuccessful offerors request a
debriefing.
a. Question to unsuccessful offerors
When not awarded a contract I request a debriefing
a. more than 2/3 's of the time
b. between 1/3 and 2/3 's of the time
c. less than 1/3 of the time
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1. Discussion
Forty two (42) contracting officials answered
this question. Sixty (60) percent responded that they request
a debriefing more than 2/3' s of the time, 24% answered that
they request a debriefing between 1/3 and 2/3 's of the time
and 16% reported that they wanted a debriefing less than 1/3
of the time. Many comments were included with the multiple
choice answers. Seventeen (17) percent of the respondents
reported that they always request a debriefing, 10% commented
that the value of the contract influences their decision to
request a debriefing. The larger the contract the more apt
they are to request a debriefing. Finally 5% of the
respondents said that they request a debriefing only when they
don't understand why they didn't win the contract award.
b. Question to AMC
How many unsuccessful offerors ask for a
debriefing?
a. less than 1/3
b. between 1/3 and 2/3 's
c. more than 2/3 's
1. Discussion
Thirty two (32) respondents answered this
question. Seventy five (75) percent reported that more than
2/3 's of unsuccessful offerors ask for a debriefing, 12%
commented that between 1/3 and 2/3 's of unsuccessful offerors
ask for a debriefing and 12% stated that less than 1/3 of
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unsuccessful offerors ask for a debriefing. Several comments
were added to the answers. Sixteen (16) percent of the AMC
officials wrote that usually all unsuccessful offerors ask for
a debriefing. Nineteen (19) percent reported that for large
solicitations normally all unsuccessful offerors ask for a
debriefing.
c. Analysis
The feedback from the two surveys is very similar.
Both surveys report that a high percent of unsuccessful
offerors request debrief ings. Additionally, both surveys have
comments that support the fact that as a solicitation
increases in value the debriefing for an unsuccessful offeror
becomes more important. The results of this question confirm
that debriefings are an important source of information for
unsuccessful offerors.
2 . Question 2
The intent of this question is to determine if AMC
officials give debriefings when they are requested.
a. Question to unsuccessful offeror






Forty two (42) unsuccessful offerors answered
this question. Eighty eight (88) percent reported that they
always get a debriefing and 12% answered that they don't
always get a debriefing when they request one. Four comments
were received. One contractor that answered no stated that it
depends on the commodity command and another reported that he
received one about 95% of the time he asked for one. Two
comments were received from contractors who answered yes. One
stated that AMC officials may try to do the debriefing on the
telephone and the other said that some debriefings he receives
are nearly worthless.
b. Question to AMC




Thirty two (32) answers were received. All 32
AMC contracting officials reported that they always gave a
debriefing when one was requested. Three respondents
commented that they feel a refusal to give a debriefing may
lead to a protest. One official commented that this is
required by the FAR. One stated that they know of no reason
not to give a debriefing if one is requested, and another said
that formal face to face debriefings are rare.
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c. Analysis
There is a difference in answers between the two
participants here. Twelve (12) percent of the contractors
stated that they didn't always receive a debriefing when they
requested one and all the AMC contracting officials reported
that they always gave a debriefing when one was requested.
The true answer is probably somewhere in between. The AMC
contracting officers may not want to admit to not giving a
debriefing or may have misunderstood a request for one as
something else. It is also possible that some requests never
get to the contracting officer and the contractor didn't
follow up on the request to ensure the contracting officer was
aware that a debriefing was requested. Additionally, there
may be some mistake on the contractors part as to when a
debriefing is authorized and they may request debrief ings when
one is not allowed. They would then not get one but think
they were entitled to one.
3. Question 3
The intent of this question is to determine who
attends debrief ings.
a. Question to unsuccessful offeror
The following personnel (by job title) from my




Many answers were given for this question.
All answers included more than one person. The most
frequently named people were the director of contracting, the
business development/program manager and the director of
engineering. Results of this question are shown in Table 1.
TABLE 1: DEFENSE CONTRACTOR PERSONNEL THAT ATTEND DEBRIEFINGS
Job Title Times Mentioned
Director of Contracting 28
Business Dev/Program Manager 27





Vice President- Engineering 3
Pricing Manager 3




Director of Technology 1
SOURCE: DEVELOPED BY RESEARCHER
b. Question to AMC
The following personnel (by job title) from my




Many people were mentioned in the answers
received for this question. The most common responses were
the contracting officer, listed by all respondents, the
contract specialist, and SSEB chairman and factor chairs.
Four of the responses listed the contracting officer as the
sole person who attends from their organization. Results of
this question are annotated in Table 2.
TABLE 2: AMC PERSONNEL THAT ATTEND DEBRIEFINGS












SOURCE: DEVELOPED BY RESEARCHER
c. Analysis
The results of this question show that the
debriefing is not a one man show for either side. Rather many
people attend debriefings and in many cases the debriefing is
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seen as important enough that SSEB chairman and vice
presidents of companies attend. The job titles of employees
that attend for unsuccessful offerors indicates that the firms
view the debriefing as an integral part of their effort to
understand why they lost the contract award and identify what




This question was designed to determine if AMC limits
the number of people who may attend debrief ings.
a. Question to unsuccessful offeror
The Army limits the number of employees that may







Forty one (41) offerors answered this
question. Ten (10) percent responded that the Army always
limits the number of employees, 59% replied that they
sometimes limit the number, and 30% stated that the Army never
limits the number of employees that can attend debrief ings.
Three comments were received on this question. Two stated
that employee numbers were only limited if the conference room
wasn't big enough to handle more people. One contractor
stated that this was infrequently a problem.
51
b. Question to AMC
I limit the number of employees that unsuccessful







Thirty one (31) AMC respondents answered this
question. Three (3) percent stated that they always limit the
number of employees, 39% said they sometimes limit the number,
and 58% stated that they never limit the number of employees
that may attend a debriefing. There were several comments
made to this question. Three Contracting officials wrote that
sometimes the conference room isn't large enough, especially
on large procurements were many participants from both sides
attend. Six people stated that the number of employees the
contractor sends has never been a problem. One stated that
the available space in the conference room dictates the number
that may attend. One respondent wrote that limiting spaces
insures that only those people necessary to understand why
their company lost the contract award attend the debriefing.
Two comments referred to lawyers attending. One person stated
that he didn't limit the number of people attending but
requested a list of people by job title who would attend the
debriefing. This is done to determine if a lawyer is going to
attend the debriefing, which would indicate a hostile
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contractor. Another person said that limiting the number of
people attending depends on if you know whether or not the
debriefing will be hostile as you don't want to brief lawyers
who are looking for free discovery.
c. Analysis
Both the unsuccessful offerors and AMC officials
report that there are times when the number of employees from
the unsuccessful firm that may attend a debriefing are
limited. The unsuccessful offerors state that it happens at
a much higher rate than AMC officials claim it happens. Only
3 0% of the contractors said they were never limited to the
number of employees that could attend a debriefing while 58%
of the AMC officials stated they never limit the number of
employees. The true answer is probably somewhere in between.
The discrepancy between these percentages may be partially
explained by a misunderstanding on the part of contractor
personnel of who limits the number of people attending. In
some cases it may be their own company limiting the numbers in
an attempt to keep travel costs down. Additionally, some AMC
officials may not have provided an accurate answer in an
attempt to downplay any effect from limiting the number of
employees that may attend a debriefing.
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5. Question 5 The intent of this question is to
determine if AMC officials are limiting, by job title, the
employees that may attend debrief ings from unsuccessful firms.
a. Question to unsuccessful offerors
The Army limits the number of employees, by job







Thirty nine (39) answers were received for
this question. Three (3) percent responded that AMC always
limits the number, by job position, 16% stated that they are
sometimes limited, and 82% said that they are never limited by
job position. Two comments were included with the answers.
One stated that they were sometimes limited to sending the
senior staff, and the other said that they were not limited
but AMC wants a list beforehand of who they are going to send.
b. Question to AMC
I limit employees, by job title, that unsuccessful





Thirty (30) responses were received for this
question. Seven (7) percent stated that they sometimes limit
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employees, by job position, from attending a debriefing and
93% said that they never limit the employees, by job title.
Three respondents commented that the unsuccessful offeror may
send any employees they want to. One stated that he never
limits the employees, by job position, but does ask for a list
of who will attend ahead of time. Another commented that he
gets a list ahead of time and uses it as a going in position
in order to prepare and organize a positive and professional
debriefing.
c. Analysis
There is a disparity between the percentage of
responses for the two sides that report a limit, by job
position, of who may attend a debriefing from the unsuccessful
firm. Only 7% of AMC personnel report ever limiting employees
by job position while 18% of unsuccessful firms report that
this has happened. Possible reasons for this difference could
be a misunderstanding on the contractor's part of who places
this limit. In some cases it may be the company and not AMC.
Additionally if this ever happened it would be the contractor
who recalled it happening first and it may be of minor
significance to AMC personnel and thus forgotten.
6. Question 6 This question was designed to determine
how long after a request debrief ings are held.
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a. Question to unsuccessful offerors
Debriefings are normally held within
calendar days of my request.
a. 0-10
b. 11-20
c. more than 20
1. Discussion
Answers were received from 42 contractors.
21% responded that debriefings were held within 10 days.
Forty eight (48) percent said between 11-20 days and the
remaining 31% stated more than 20 days. Only one comment was
reported. The contractor wrote that the time varied but was
usually close to or in excess of 30 days.
b. Question to AMC





c. more than 20
1. Discussion
Thirty one (31) AMC officials responded to
this question. Eighty four (84) percent stated that
debriefings were done within 10 days of request. The other
16% said it was done between 11-20 days. Many comments were
written in response to this question. One respondent wrote
that it is best to schedule debriefings as soon as possible so
that SSEB members are available to assist. One said that he
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is always prepared to debrief the day after notification of
unsuccessful offerors. A delay gives the appearance that you
had to stop and document why the offeror lost. Another
respondent said that you should allow sufficient time to
prepare adequately and still have the decision process fresh
in mind. One contracting officer wrote that his debriefs are
normally built into the acquisition cycle schedule and pre-
scheduled for the first 3 days after contract award. Another
AMC official said that he did it within 10 days of request, as
early debrief ings help offset possible protests. Three
respondents stated that the time depends on the number of
offerors and when both parties can get together.
c. Analysis
There is a significant difference of opinion
between the two parties as to how long after the request the
debrief ings are held. Eighty four (84) percent of AMC
personnel said debrief ings were held within 10 days of request
while only 21% of the unsuccessful offerors reported that they
were done within this same time frame. One reason for this
difference could result from the requirement for the
debriefing request to be written. If these written requests
are mailed contractors may consider the clock to start on
their request when they drop their request in the mail. AMC
officials would most likely start the clock when they receive
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the request . This reason alone would not solve the vast
difference in opinion between the two parties on this issue.
When a debriefing is done can have an effect on if a protest
is filed or not. This in turn can have an effect on any-
subsequent debriefing given. Contractors have 10 days after
contract award is announced to file a protest which will stop
work on the contract. The survey shows if a debriefing is not
given within these 10 days a contractor may file a protest
because he may suspect some type of impropriety in the source
selection decision process. A debriefing done within the 10
day window may show the contractor there was no impropriety in
the decision process and no protest is necessary.
Additionally, any debriefings given to unsuccessful offerors
that have already protested the contract award may not be very
informative because the contracting officer is on the
defensive and is not looking to give the unsuccessful offeror
information that could be used in the protest.
7. Question 7 The intent of this question is to
determine when the unsuccessful offerors and AMC officials
think the debriefing should be done.
a. Question to Unsuccessful offeror
Debriefings should be conducted within
calendar days after contract award.
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1. Discussion
Thirty eight (38) contractors answered this
question. Answers received ranged from 5 to 30 days. Fifty
(50) percent of those that responded said that the debriefing
should be done within 10 days. The average answer to this
question is 14.4 days. Three different comments were
included with the answers. Five contractors responded that
the debriefing must be done within the limits of the time to
protest. Two people stated that the sooner the better and
that sooner may help head off unnecessary protests. Lastly,
one official stated that he recognized the difficulty of
getting all the AMC people together but earlier feedback is
better.
b. Question to AMC
Debriefings should be conducted within
calendar days after contract award.
1. Discussion
Twenty eight (28) AMC officials answered this
question. The answers ranged from 4 to 3 days with the
average being 14.5 days. Fifty three (53) percent said that
debriefings should be done within 10 calendar days after
contract award. Several respondents provided comments with
their answer. Two stated that the FAR says to conduct the
debriefings as soon as possible. One stated that the SSEB
goes to the four winds after award so it is best to do it as
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soon as possible. One official commented that the 10 day-
protest cut off is a factor, however SSEB support is the final
determining factor. Another comment was that many protests
are filed after a debriefing so the debriefing should be done
quickly. Two officials said to let the offeror decide when
the debriefing should be done and honor their request.
c. Analysis
The responses from both the contractors and AMC
officials indicate that debriefings should be done in a timely
manner. The average response for both groups show that
debriefings should be done within 14 days of contract award.
8. Question 8 The intent of this question is to
determine who normally conducts the debriefing.
a. Question to unsuccessful offeror
normally debriefs me.
a. the contracting officer
b. the source selection evaluation board chairman
c. a combination of both a & b
d. other
1. Discussion
Forty two (42) defense contractors answered
this question. Twenty one (21) percent responded that the
contracting officer debriefs them, 74% said that a combination
of the contracting officer and SSEB chairman debrief them and
5% stated that someone else debriefs them. This other person
was the program manager. Several comments were received that
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added names of others who participate. Lawyers were mentioned
3 times, technical evaluators were listed on 4 surveys, cost
analysts were mentioned 2 times and a contract specialist was
listed once. One additional comment was that when the
contract officer is the only person to debrief the debriefing
tends to be dry and not very informative.
b. Question to AMC
Debriefings are conducted by (give job title)
1. Discussion
Five different answers were received for this
question. Thirty eight (38) percent of the respondents
indicated that the contracting officer conducts the
debriefing. Nineteen (19) percent said the contracting
officer and the contract specialist conduct the debrief ings,
and 19% stated the contracting officer and technical experts
do it. Twenty five (25) percent of the people said the
contracting officer and the SSEB conduct debrief ings.
c. Analysis
Both the contractors and AMC officials answers to
this question reveal that a contracting officer participates
in almost all debrief ings. They are generally joined by such
personnel as the SSEB chairman, SSEB members, technical
representatives, and contract specialist. It is clear though
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that the contracting officer is the key player for AMC in the
debriefing process. This coincides with what the AFARS
recommends
.
9. Question 9 This question was designed to determine
where debrief ings are held.
a. Question to unsuccessful offerors
Debriefings are normally held at
.
a. at my location




Forty two (42) contractors answered this
question with 2 contractors giving 2 answers. Eighty six (86)
percent of the responses indicated that the debriefings are
held at the Army's location. Fourteen (14) percent of the
answers reported that they are done by telephone. Two
contractors listed both of these answers. Two different
comments accompanied these answers. Three contractors who
answered that debriefings are normally held at the Army's
location stated that sometimes telephone debriefings are done.
One of these officials stated this is usually a conference
call. Another of these officials said that the telephone
debriefings are frequently done when the AMC command is out of
town.
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b. Question to AMC
Debriefings are normally held
a. at my location




Thirty four (34) answers were received.
Eighty eight (88) percent of the answers indicated that
debriefings are normally held at the AMC location while 12%
reported they are done by telephone. Two contracting officers
stated both of these answers. Eight AMC personnel commented
that debriefings are sometimes done by phone. Four of these
people added that this was especially so for small
procurements. Two officials stated that debriefings should
never be done at the unsuccessful offeror's location,
c. Analysis
The answers to this question are almost identical
for each survey. The results indicate that most debriefings
are done in person at the AMC location. A small percent of
the debriefings are done by phone, especially when the
procurement is small or when the AMC location is out of town.
Not one respondent reported that any debriefing was ever done
at the offeror's location. All of this indicates that there
is an unwritten practice to not conduct debriefings at the
offeror's location. If the offeror wants the service in
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person he must travel to get it. The reason contractors will
request debrief ings by phone for smaller procurements is that
they are not willing to pay for travel costs. The costs would
outweigh the benefits in these cases. Instead they will get
as much information as they can by telephone.
10. Question 10
The intent of this question is to determine if
questions are allowed and answered in debrief ings.
a. Question to unsuccessful offeror
The Army
.
a. doesn't allow questions
b. allows and answers all questions
c. allows and answers some questions
1. Discussion
Forty two (42) answers were received for this
question. Seven (7) percent of the respondents said that the
Army doesn't allow questions. Two (2) percent stated that
questions are allowed and they are all answered. Ninety one
(91) percent indicated that the Army allows and answers some
questions. Four comments reported that the answers were not
detailed enough. Two contractors commented that they were
limited to asking questions about their proposal only. One
offeror stated that allowing and answering questions really
depends on who the contracting officer is.
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b. Question to AMC
I
.
a. don't allow questions
b. allow and answer all questions
c. allow and answer some questions
1. Discussion
All 32 contracting officers answered this
question. Thirty eight (38) percent stated that they allow
and answer all questions and 62% said that they allow and
answer some questions. Several comments were received. Eight
respondents said that they don't allow questions about another
offeror's proposal. Three stated that they answer questions
to the extent the regulations allow. Two officials said that
they may answer some questions in writing after the
debriefing. One contracting officer stated that he can't
answer some questions and some aren't appropriate. Another
said that all questions and answers must be in writing and
that the openness of the debrief depends on the likelihood of
a protest. Lastly, one official wrote that he uses a caucus
between questions and answers.
c. Analysis
There is a large difference between the two
surveys with the answer that the Army allows and answers all
questions. Thirty eight (38) percent of AMC personnel gave
this answer versus only 2% of the contractors. Some
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interpretations of the possible survey answers may have been
done to cause this. It doesn't seem likely that AMC officials
would answer all questions asked by contractors, especially in
the contractor's quest to get information on the winner's
proposal . Consequently a more accurate answer for AMC is
probably much lower. Several contractors reported that they
are not allowed to ask questions during a debrief. This
doesn't allow the contractor to get the information he needs
to understand the evaluation of his proposal.
11. Question 11
This question was designed to determine why some
questions asked by unsuccessful offerors are not answered.
a. Question to unsuccessful offeror
If the Army doesn't answer some of my questions it
is because
a. they can't answer them due to regulations or
confidential/proprietary business information
b. they won't answer them due to their concern for a
protest
c. other
d. not applicable, they answer all my questions
1. Discussion
A total of 56 answers were recorded for this
question. Although the question was designed to get only one
answer from each respondent, 15 of the 41 officials who
answered this question gave two responses. These 15 answered
that the Army doesn't answer some questions due to both
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regulations and confidential/proprietary business information,
and their concern for a protest. Fifty nine (59) percent of
the answers indicated that regulations or
confidential/proprietary business information is the reason
the Army doesn't answer all questions. Thirty six (36)
percent of the answers pointed to a concern for protests as
the reason. Five (5) percent of the respondents listed other
reasons which were that the question is not relevant or is
source selection sensitive or classified, they don't know the
answer to the questions they don't answer, and a hidden agenda
prevents them from answering some questions. One comment was
recorded. It stated that AMC personnel tend to error on the
conservative side when determining when to answer a question.
b. Question to AMC
If I don't answer some of the unsuccessful
offerors questions it is because
a. I can't answer them due to regulations or
confidential/proprietary business information
b. I won't answer them due to a possible protest
c. other
d. not applicable, I answer all questions
1. Discussion
Thirty five answers were received for this
question. Three AMC officials gave two answers. Eighty three
(83) percent of the answers indicated that when questions
aren't answered it is due to regulations, or
confidential/proprietary business information. Nine (9)
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percent of the answers stated some questions aren't answered
for other reasons. These reasons are when the offeror is
seeking opinion and not facts, and if information is not
available and then an attempt will be made to provide it
later. Two surveys gave this latter reason as their answer.
Contracting officers submitted several comments to this
question. Two stated that they don't worry about protests and
answer as many questions as possible. One of these continued
that the Freedom of Information Act allows most information to
be disclosed so you might as well give it to them up front.
The other added that the Government Accounting Office will let
a protestor see everything during discovery so he doesn't hide
anything. Another official stated that when there is the
potential for a protest it makes his answers rather anemic.
One official stated that he doesn't answer questions that




Both sides agree that many questions are not
answered due to regulations or confidential/proprietary
business information. However a higher percentage of
contracting officers than unsuccessful offerors stated this as
the reason some questions aren't answered. This is most
likely a result of how the FAR and AFARS are interpreted. It
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is the contracting officer's responsibility to operate within
the regulations, so they are much more likely to take a more
conservative view of what these regulations mean. The two
survey groups disagree on the issue of not answering questions
due to a fear of being protested. Not one contracting officer
answered that fear of a protest prevents them from answering
a question while 46% of the contractors stated that this is
the reason some questions aren't answered. This leads to the
conclusion that contracting officers feel they are answering
all they can legally answer while many contractors believe
questions that could be answered are not being answered.
12. Question 12 This question was designed to determine
if contracting officers pass along all the information that
unsuccessful offerors are entitled to according to the
regulations
.
a. Question to unsuccessful offerors
Debriefings normally consist of
a. limited information, because
b. as much information as the Army can give in
accordance with the regulations and confidential/proprietary
business information
1. Discussion
All 42 respondents answered this question.
48% stated that the debriefings consisted of limited
information. Fifty five (55) percent of these people said the
reason was due to the fear of a protest. Two said it was due
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to proprietary data rights and three others said it was due to
restrictive regulations. Three contractors stated that it was
because of an attempt to cover up improper procurement
practices. The last reason given was that the contracting
officers don't want to compare the offeror with the winner.
The other 52% of the respondents answered that the Army gives
out as much information as it can under the current
regulations and confidential/proprietary business information
stipulations. Two comments to the question were given. One
was that certain contracting officers give very detailed
debrief ings while others give generic debrief ings. The other
stated that it depends on what MSC you're dealing with as some
provide more information than others.
b. Question to AMC
Debriefings normally consist of
a. limited information, because
b. as much information as I can give in accordance
with the regulations and confidential/proprietary business
information
1. Discussion
Thirty one contracting officers answered this
question and all stated that they give out as much information
as they can in accordance with the regulations and
confidential/proprietary business data. Many comments were
provided with the answers. Five people stated that providing
all the information you can helps prevent protests and other
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problems such as congressional inquiries. One contracting
officer stated that he only gives out the minimum information
necessary. Another said that he gives only a summary
debriefing and provides additional information if asked. One
person stated that he thinks AMC is extremely conservative in
what information it gives out. One comment indicated that
contractors want information that compares their proposal to
the winner's. Lastly, one official said his command now gives
out the same information to the unsuccessful offeror on his
proposal that is given to the SSA.
c. Analysis
There is a large difference between what the AMC
officials and the unsuccessful offerors believe as to the
extent of the information given out in debrief ings. All the
contracting officers said that they give out what they can,
(although some of their comments refute this) while almost one
half of the contractors said that the debriefings consist of
only limited information. While contracting officers
apparently feel that they give out all the information they
can there is some evidence that certain commands and
contracting officers are willing to provide more information
to unsuccessful offerors than others. Factors such as fear of
protests, conservative interpretations of the regulations,
time constraints, and heavy work loads probably prevent some
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commands and contracting officers from providing all the data
they could provide under optimum conditions.
13. Question 13 The intent of this question is to
determine if the threat of a protest has any effect on the
amount of information given out in a debriefing.
a. Question to unsuccessful offerors
The Army would provide more information if the






d don ' t know
1. Discussion
Forty two (42) answers were received for this
question. Twelve (12) percent of the offerors believe that
the threat of a protest always effects how much information is
given out in a debriefing. Thirty eight (38) percent believe
it sometimes has an effect and 2% believe it never has an
effect. Forty three (43) percent don't know if the Army would
provide more information if the threat of a protest didn't
exist. Two respondents commented that if this wasn't the case
then the debrief ings would be more comprehensive.
b. Question to AMC
I would provide more information if the possible








Twenty nine (29) contracting officers
responded to this question. Seven (7) percent said that the
threat of a protest always influenced how much information
they provide in a debriefing. Twenty eight (28) percent
stated that a protest sometimes influences them and 65% said




Both contracting officers and unsuccessful
offerors say that the threat of a protest influences the
amount of information that is given out in a debriefing.
Fully one third of the contracting officers say that it
effects them at least sometimes. Therefore a conclusion can
be made that the threat of a protest influences the quality of
many debrief ings. Contractors that are hostile or threaten a
protest before the debriefing is conducted are thus less
likely to get the same amount of information they would get if
the contracting officer felt confident no protest would be
filed.
14. Question 14 This question was designed to determine
if debriefings are conducted in accordance with the major
elements of the RFP.
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a. Question to unsuccessful offerors
The Army debriefs in accordance with the major







All 42 contractors answered this question.
Fifty (50) percent stated that the Army always debriefs in
accordance with the RFP. Forty four (44) percent said that
they sometimes do and 7% indicated that the Army never
debriefs in accordance with the RFP. Two comments were
submitted with the answers. One contractor commented that
whether or not the debriefing is done in accordance with the
major elements of the RFP depends on the command. Another
stated that only summary data is provided for the major
elements
.
b. Question to AMC






Thirty (30) AMC officials answered this
question. Ninety three (93) percent stated that they always
debrief in accordance with the RFP. Seven (7) percent said
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that they sometimes do. One official commented that he
usually limits the debriefing to only the weak or deficient
factors in the proposal . Another stated that he gives
narrative remarks for all factors and sub- factors.
c. Analysis
There is a large difference between the answers
given by the unsuccessful offerors and the AMC contracting
officers. Only 50% of the unsuccessful offerors believe that
contracting officers always debrief in accordance with the RFP
whereas 93% of the contracting officers believe they do. This
difference could be accounted for by the amount of information
given out for each major element. If only a small amount of
information is given out unsuccessful offerors may have
interpreted this as not having been debriefed in accordance
with the major elements while contracting officers may have
considered this being debriefed in accordance with the major
elements
.
15. Question 15 This question was designed to determine
if debriefings clearly point out weaknesses in the
unsuccessful offeror's proposal.
a. Question to unsuccessful offerors









Forty two (42) responses were given for this
question. Twenty four (24) percent reported that the
debriefings always clearly identify weaknesses in the
offeror's proposal. Sixty seven (67) percent said that they
sometimes did and 9% indicated that they never clearly
identified weaknesses in their proposal. Two comments were
provided. They all indicated that improvements need to be
made here. Seven unsuccessful offerors stated that there was
not enough information given out to determine exactly what the
weaknesses were in the proposal . One respondent commented
that it seems like just enough trivial weaknesses are
identified to justify a low cost award.
b. Question to AMC








Thirty two (32) contracting officers answered
this question. Eighty one (81) percent stated that they
always clearly identify weaknesses in unsuccessful offeror's
proposals. Nineteen (19) percent responded that they
sometimes clearly identify weaknesses. Several comments were
added to the answers. Two contracting officers commented that
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weaknesses or deficiencies not discussed prior to the
debriefing should not be addressed during the debriefing.
Another stated the same thing, but he added that he had an
experience with a protest to GAO where GAO determined that any
weaknesses that negatively affect the offeror's proposal must
be discussed during negotiations or GAO may determine
meaningful discussions were not held. Another official
commented that weaknesses are not always available on each
element due to a lack of clear documentation in the technical
evaluations. Two contracting officers commented that major
deficiencies are always addressed but weaknesses are only
addressed if asked or they had a significant impact on the
source selection. The last comment was that weaknesses will
be covered if they exist but it is extremely difficult to
debrief a good proposal with no technical weaknesses.
c. Analysis
Several unsuccessful offerors and contracting
officers stated that debriefings clearly identify weaknesses
in many cases but not all cases. This means that not all the
information that could be given to an unsuccessful offeror is
always being given. Providing the offeror with his weaknesses
allows the contractor to see how his proposal stood up to the
evaluation criteria and more specifically where his proposal
did not measure up to the standards expected of it in
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accordance with the evaluation criteria. Clearly identifying
the offeror's weaknesses in the debriefing benefits the
contractor but it is not being done in all debrief ings.
16. Question 16. The intent of this question is to
determine it debrief ings cover the three major elements of
most proposals.
a. Question to unsuccessful offerors
The Army debriefs me on the merits of my








This question allowed the respondents to
circle all answers that apply to debriefings they have
attended. A total of 113 answers were received with all 42
offerors selecting at least two answers. Ninety five (95)
percent of the offerors reported that the Army debriefs them
on the technical merits of their proposal. Eighty six (86)
percent stated that they are debriefed on the management
merits and 79% said they are debriefed on the cost merits of
their proposal.
b. Question to AMC
I debrief unsuccessful offerors on the







The question was set up to allow the
contracting officers to circle all answers that apply to
debriefings they give. All 32 contracting officers answered
the question and a total of 80 answered were recorded. Eighty
seven (87) percent replied that they debrief the technical
merits of a proposal. Eighty four (84) percent stated that
they debrief the management merits and 78% said that they
debrief the cost merits of a proposal . Several comments were
included with the answers. Three people wrote that they cover
all criteria advertised in the RFP. One official said that he
also debriefs logistics, production, and integrated support.
Another contracting officer stated that he covers whatever
issues the unsuccessful offeror wants to discuss. Finally,
one respondent stated that he doesn't debrief cost as the
unsuccessful offeror knows his price and the winner's price.
c. Analysis
The large majority of both the unsuccessful
offerors and contracting officers responded that debriefings
cover the technical, management and cost merits of the
proposal
. It would seem though that these answers should be
approaching 100% as almost all procurements that warrant a
debriefing contain something in these categories to evaluate.
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This is certainly true of price as it is a required
consideration in all procurements. The procurement command
should do some type of cost realism evaluation on each
proposal submitted. To not debrief price indicates that the
contracting officer is not passing along to the offeror the
evaluation of the price portion of the proposal. By not
debriefing all three of these areas contracting officers may
leave out information that could be valuable to the
unsuccessful offeror.
17. Question 17 This question was designed to determine
if the unsuccessful offerors are satisfied with the debriefing
on the technical, management, and cost portions of their
proposal
.
a. Question to unsuccessful offerors
I am satisfied with the debriefing on the







Forty one (41) unsuccessful offerors answered
this question. Five (5) percent said that they are always
satisfied with the debriefing on the technical, management,
and cost elements of their proposal. Eighty (80) percent
stated that they are sometimes satisfied and 15% responded
that they are never satisfied with the debriefing on these
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elements. Three offerors commented that debriefings are
generic in nature and not enough detail is given.
b. Question to AMC
Unsuccessful offerors are satisfied with the








d don ' t know
1. Discussion
Twenty nine (29) contracting officers answered
this question. Twenty four (24) percent stated that
unsuccessful offerors are always satisfied with the debriefing
on the technical, management, and cost elements of their
proposal. Sixty six (66) percent said that offerors are
sometimes satisfied. Three (3) percent said they are never
satisfied and 7% stated that they didn't know. Several
comments were received. Three contracting officers stated
that the unsuccessful offerors usually feel the debriefing is
not forthcoming in this regard because the offerors want to
know more about how they compared with the winner's proposal.
One contracting officer said that often times offeror's
engineers take the debrief on the technical aspects of the
proposal as a personal attack and this makes it extremely
difficult to debrief that portion.
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c. Analysis
A small percentage of both groups surveyed stated
that unsuccessful offerors are always satisfied with the
discussion on the technical, management, and cost portions of
the debriefing. A large portion of each said offerors are
sometimes satisfied. This is most likely due to two reasons.
First, the offerors are looking for all the information they
can get concerning the evaluation of these areas of their
proposal and other proposals, especially the winners. The FAR
and AFARS specifically deny access to some of the information
that the contractors would like to see. Second, the
debriefing may not contain all the information that the source
selection committee has on the proposal. This could be due to
poor documentation, a briefing from a second hand source who
is not as knowledgeable as the evaluator, or a fear of
debriefing something that was discovered and not addressed
with the offeror during discussions.
18. Question 18 The intent of this question is to
determine if unsuccessful offerors get information which they
can use in drafting proposals for future procurements.
a. Question to unsuccessful offerors
Debrief ings give me information that leads to more








Forty one (41) offerors answered this
question. Seven (7) percent stated that debriefings always
give them information which leads to more competitive
proposals in future procurements. Seventy one (71) percent
reported that they sometimes get information to aid future
proposals and 22% said they never get information which
improves the competitiveness of future proposals. Two
comments were submitted for this question. One contractor
wrote that he rarely gets this information from the debriefing
but through "contacts" in the community. The other comment
was from an offeror who said that the only useful information
he has gotten from the debriefings is that the low cost
proposal always seems to win. As a result he is turning his
best value proposals into low cost proposals.
b. Question to AMC
Debriefings give unsuccessful offerors information







d don ' t know
1. Discussion
Thirty (30) contracting officers answered this
question. Twenty three (23) percent stated they believe
debriefings always give information to unsuccessful offerors
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that aid them in preparing more competitive proposals in
future procurements. Fifty seven (57) percent said
debrief ings sometimes give this information. Three (3)
percent think, debrief ings never give offerors information that
is useful for future procurements, and 17% don't know. Three
different comments were submitted. Six contracting officers
stated that their intent is to give out information that will
be useful for future competition. One official wrote that the
offerors learn how AMC utilizes and evaluates best value
procurement. If they don't learn anything else they learn
this. The last person to comment said that some contractors
accept the critique and criticism of their proposal and learn
from the debrief and some argue each point made and thus are




The majority of those surveyed on both sides
indicated that debriefings sometimes provide information that
leads to more competitive proposals in the future. The goal
would be to increase the information that allows unsuccessful
offerors to prepare more competitive proposals in the future.
There are some road blocks that must be removed to improve
this. Unsuccessful offerors must not allow their emotions or
pride to interfere with assimilating the information given out
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in the debriefing. Arguing each point brought up by the
contracting officer detracts from good listening and may put
the contracting officer on the defensive and cause him to
refrain from passing along all the data he has. Conversely
contracting officers must make every effort to get as much
information to the contractor as they can.
19. Question 19 This question was designed to determine
if after a debriefing unsuccessful offerors fully understand
why they do not have the most advantageous proposal
.
a. Question to unsuccessful offerors
Upon conclusion of a debrief, I completely





c. never, why not
1. Discussion
All 42 offerors answered this question. Two
(2) percent of the contractors reported that they always
completely understood why they didn't win the contract award.
Seventy six (76) percent stated that they sometimes completely
understood and 22% said that they never completely understood
why they didn't win the contract award. Several comments were
received for this question. Five offerors commented that
there is not enough information given out to completely
understand why they didn't win the contract award. Three
contractors stated that they often feel that the real reasons
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why they didn't win the contract award are not given. Another
offeror said that the Army doesn't compare proposals so you
don't know if you lost on technical merit or a subjective best
buy.
b. Question to AMC
Upon conclusion of a debrief the unsuccessful









Thirty one (31) contracting officers answered
this question. Twenty six (26) percent said they believe that
after a debriefing contractors completely understand why they
didn't win the contract award. Forty two (42) percent stated
they believe contractors sometimes completely understand.
Three (3) percent responded that contractors never understand
and 29% said that they don't know if a contractor completely
understands why he didn't win the contract award. Several
comments were submitted. Two officials responded that a lack
of details of the winner's proposal or any comparative
rankings make it almost impossible for the offerors to
completely understand why they lost. Three people wrote that
some offerors can't or refuse to recognize that someone else's
proposal could be better and thus can't understand how they
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lost. One contracting officer commented that the regulatory-
restrictions on what can be discussed sometimes prevents the
offeror from getting enough information to completely
understand why they lost. Finally another contracting officer
replied that when the offeror's proposal is very good and has
no real weaknesses but the winning proposal is just a little
better it may be very difficult for the offeror to understand
why they didn't win.
c. Analysis
Contracting officers believe the unsuccessful
offerors understand why they lost the contract award at a
higher rate than the unsuccessful offerors actually
understand. This leads to the conclusion that contracting
officers think the debriefings are more effective than they
actually are. Two key problems are identified here. First,
unsuccessful offerors state that not enough information is
given out to understand why they didn't win the contract
award. Second, contracting officers commented that since
comparisons between proposals can't be made it makes it
difficult for contractors to get enough information to
completely understand why they lost. The Army AFARS thus has
a negative impact on the quantity of information the
unsuccessful offeror can get.
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20. Question 20. The intent of this question is to
determine if debriefings are of value to the unsuccessful
offerors.
a. Question to unsuccessful offerors
The debriefings are to my company.
a. valuable
b. somewhat valuable
c. not at all valuable
1. Discussion
Forty two (42) unsuccessful offerors answered
this question. Thirty eight (38) percent stated that the
debriefings are valuable, 50% said they are somewhat valuable
and 12% reported that debriefings are not at all valuable.
Contractors submitted four comments to this question. One
contractor wrote that although debriefings are only somewhat
valuable he never passes up an opportunity to meet with his
customer. He continued that team building and getting to know
the key players are too important to not attend a debriefing.
Another offeror stated that the real details on the evaluation
of his proposal are dug out over time from the command, thus
making the debriefing not as valuable as it could be. Another
comment was that there is nothing given to help with future
proposals. Finally one unsuccessful offeror responded that
the debriefings are cordial but not meaningful in terms of
useful information given out.
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b. Question to AMC




c. not at all valuable
1. Discussion
Twenty nine (29) contracting officers answered
this question. Sixty six (66) percent believe debriefings are
valuable to unsuccessful offerors. Thirty four (34) percent
believe debriefings are somewhat valuable to them and 3%
believe debriefings are not at all valuable to unsuccessful
offerors. Four comments were received with the answers. One
contracting officer stated that since he can't compare scores
and assessments his debriefings are not as useful to
unsuccessful offerors as the offerors think they could be.
Another contracting officer said that he is convinced
debriefings are worthless because they don't tell the
unsuccessful offerors what they really want to know- how they
stood compared to the winner. The next comment was that the
regulation and legal constraints sanitize the debriefing so
much that very little of any value is left in the debriefing.
Finally, one official responded that all the unsuccessful
offerors want to talk about is the winner's proposal and he
doesn't provide much information on it.
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c. Analysis
Contracting officers believe debriefings are
valuable to unsuccessful offerors at a much higher percentage
than unsuccessful offerors say they are. Thus debriefings are
not as valuable as contracting officers think they are.
Consequently many contracting officers may not be making any
attempts to improve the debriefing process as they believe the
system is satisfying the needs of the unsuccessful offerors.
On the other hand the contractors need to understand that some
information that they would like to get debriefed on such as
details of the winner's proposal is not releasable under the
current regulations.
21. Question 21 This question was designed to determine
if AMC offers to give debriefings to unsuccessful offerors
that don't request a debriefing on their own.
a. Question to unsuccessful offerors
The Army offers to debrief me even when I don't







Forty two (42) unsuccessful offerors answered
this question. Twelve (12) percent stated that the Army
offered to debrief them even when they didn't ask for a
debriefing. Thirty eight (38) percent said that the Army
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sometimes asked them, and 50% responded that the Army never
asked them. One contractor commented that the notification he
receives that he is an unsuccessful offeror typically offers
the opportunity for a debriefing.
b. Question to AMC
My organization offers to debrief all unsuccessful







Thirty one (31) contracting officers answered
this question. Fifty two (52) percent responded that they
always offer to debrief all unsuccessful offerors. Thirteen
(13) percent stated that they sometimes offer to debrief those
offerors who don't ask for a debriefing and 35% answered they
never offer to debrief offerors that don't ask for a
debriefing. Several comments were given for this question.
Six contracting officers stated that they never offer a
debriefing but only honor requests. One official commented
that at the major system level debriefings are normally pre-
scheduled for all offerors. Another contracting officer
commented he offers the debrief in the RFP but otherwise it is
not mentioned. Finally, one official responded that he offers
a debriefing in the letter notifying the contractor that he
didn't win the contract award.
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c. Analysis
The answers between the two groups surveyed vary.
The percentage of contracting officers who say they offer
debrief ings to all unsuccessful offerors, even those that
don't ask for one, is higher than the percentage of
unsuccessful offerors who say the same thing. The key here is
that offering debriefings to all unsuccessful offerors is not
happening. The regulations do not require AMC to offer
debriefings to anyone. It only states that debriefings will
be given to those unsuccessful offerors that ask for one in
writing. However, if debriefings are not offered there may be
offerors who do not know they exist or that they can get one
for the particular procurement they submitted a proposal for.
22. Question 22 This question was designed around the
specific language of H.R. 3161. The intent was to determine
which points of the resolution unsuccessful offerors and
contracting officers like and to determine how open each of
the two groups are to liberalizing what can be discussed at
debriefings. Both surveys asked for the respondents to circle
all answers they agreed with.
a. Question to unsuccessful offerors
Debriefings should address (circle all that
apply)
, as long as confidential business information is
not disclosed.
a. the basic proposed technical solution of the
awardee
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b. the overall evaluated cost of the awardee and
debriefed offeror
c. cost or price associated with the major components
of the awardee 's proposal
d. overall ranking and total evaluation scores of the
awardee and debriefed offeror




none of the above
g. other
1. Discussion
The unsuccessful offerors showed overwhelming
support for answers a through e. They felt that all the
changes proposed by H.R. 3161 were good ideas. Eighty three
(83) percent of the offerors stated that debriefings should
address the basic proposed technical solution of the awardee.
Seventy nine (79) percent of the officials said debrief ings
should cover the overall evaluated cost of the awardee and
debriefed offeror. Seventy six (76) percent of the
contractors responded that the cost or price associated with
the major components of the awardee 's proposal should be
addressed in debrief ings. Ninety (90) percent of the
unsuccessful offerors stated that the overall ranking and
total evaluation scores of the awardee and debriefed offeror
should be covered. Eighty six (86) percent of the contractors
said debriefings should contain the technical point scores of
the awardee and debriefed offeror. Two (2) percent of the
offerors stated that debriefings should contain none of the
above. Several comments were submitted with these answers.
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Three unsuccessful offerors stated that as much information as
can be disclosed without violating proprietary rights should
be given out. Another contractor responded that a narrative
evaluation of the debriefed offeror's proposal should be given
in addition to the other answers. One offeror said that the
basic rationale for selection of the winning proposal should
be given. Lastly, one contractor stated that more comparative
information should be given out.
b. Question to AMC
Debriefings should address (circle all that
apply) , as long as confidential business information is
not disclosed.
a. the basic proposed technical solution of the
awardee
b. the overall evaluated cost of the awardee and
debriefed offeror
c. cost or price associated with the major components
of the awardee 's proposal
d. overall ranking and total evaluation scores of the
awardee and debriefed offeror




none of the above
g. other
1. Discussion
Contracting officers didn't show much support
for including the information in these answers in debriefings.
Thirteen (13) percent of the contracting officers stated that
debriefings should address the basic proposed technical
solution of the awardee. Forty one (41) percent of the
officials said the overall evaluated cost of the awardee and
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debriefed offeror should be included. The cost or price
associated with the major components of the awardee's proposal
should be covered by the debriefing according to 6% of the
contracting officers. Twenty two (22) percent of these
officials said that the overall ranking and total evaluation
scores of the awardee and debriefed offeror should be covered
in debrief ings. Technical point scores of the awardee and
debriefed offeror should be covered in debriefings according
to 3% of the contracting officers surveyed. Twenty eight (28)
percent of the contracting officers responded that none of the
above should be covered. Sixteen (16) percent of the
contracting officers stated that debriefings should contain
other items. All but one of these other answers stated in
general terms that only the offeror's proposal should be
covered and that weak and deficient areas should be addressed.
In other words these officials restated what the FAR requires.
The other item listed was that the basis for why the award was
given to the winner should be discussed. Two different
comments were included with the answers. Two contracting
officers said that information regarding the winner's proposal
should be given only in general terms. Another contracting
officer stated that he generally gives factor ratings and
evaluated cost for the winning proposal and factor, sub- factor
ratings and evaluated cost for the offeror's proposal.
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c. Analysis
The unsuccessful offerors showed strong support
for debriefings to include all the items that H.R. 3161
proposed. Contracting officers, on the other hand, were much
more conservative and only one of the proposed items received
higher than a 22% support of the contracting officers. This
item was revealing the overall evaluated cost for the
offeror's and winner's proposals. Almost one third of the
contracting officers stated that none of the answers should be
addressed in debriefings. The answers given to this question
show that unsuccessful offerors would like debriefings to
include more specific information. Additionally this question
shows the conservative nature of contracting officers with
regard to debriefing. Contracting officers didn't show strong
support for any of these proposed additions to what should be
covered in debriefings.
23 . Question 23 The intent of this question is to
determine if when a debriefing is conducted has any impact on
if an unsuccessful offeror will protest the contract award.
a. Question to unsuccessful offerors









Forty one (41) unsuccessful offerors answered
this question. Twelve (12) percent answered it is always true
that the sooner they are debriefed the less likely they are to
protest. Fifty one (51) percent stated that sometimes the
sooner they are debriefed the less likely they are to protest.
Fifteen (15) percent of the offerors stated that this is never
the case. Twenty two (22) percent didn't answer one of the
possible answers but commented the question was not applicable
to them. This may mean they never protest or that the
timeliness of a debriefing doesn't impact on their decision to
protest. One offeror commented that the quality of the
debriefing and not the time when it is given is the
determining factor if a protest will be filed. Three offerors
stated they never protest.
b. Question to AMC
The sooner a debriefing is conducted, the more







Twenty eight (28) contracting officers
answered this question. Thirty two (32) percent stated that
the sooner a debriefing is conducted the more likely it is to
prevent a protest. Fifty seven (57) percent said that this is
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sometimes the case and 10% responded that this is never the
case. Several comments were submitted with the answers. Four
contracting officers commented that they don't think when a
debriefing is done influences if an unsuccessful offeror will
protest. Another contracting officer stated that the
unsuccessful offeror only has 10 days to file a protest to
stop the procurement action.
c. Analysis
Many unsuccessful offerors and contracting
officers say that the sooner a debriefing is conducted the
less likely the unsuccessful offeror is to protest. This
should certainly be true for debrief ings that are done within
the window authorized for the unsuccessful offeror to submit
a protest. A competent debriefing conducted within this
window that shows the source selection process was proper and
fair should yield few if any protests. A debrief conducted
after the 10 day protest window may initiate a protest because
the offeror may have questions concerning the fairness of the
source selection process but doesn't have the information that
the debriefing would provide that shows the selection process
was proper.
24. Question 24 The intent of this question is to
determine what the strengths of the Army debriefing process
are. This question is valuable because the set up and content
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of a debriefing are very dependent on which command the
debriefing is done in and which contracting officer conducts
the debriefing. Debrief ings in each command can be improved
by incorporating the strengths from the other commands.
a. Question to unsuccessful offerors
List 3 strengths of the Army debriefing process.
1. Discussion
Twenty six (26) of the 42 unsuccessful
offerors who returned surveys answered this question. Many
strengths of the debriefing process were identified. The major
themes from these strengths are listed below. The number of
unsuccessful offerors that identified each area as a strength
are annotated in parenthesis.
• Contracting officers offer to debrief unsuccessful
offerors (2)
.
• There are no restrictions on who may attend (2)
.
• The debrief ings are done in a timely manner (8)
• The evaluators are normally at the debriefing and they
debrief their part or are available to answer questions
(4) .
• Debriefings are well organized and generally follow the
RFP outline (2) .
• Debriefings allow for interaction between the two parties
and both sides get to know each other (2)
.




• Debrief ings isolate major shortcomings and weaknesses in
each area evaluated (4)
.
• Strengths of our proposal are identified along with our
weaknesses (2)
.
• If the debriefing is conducted properly it will help
improve the competitiveness of future proposals (1)
.
• Debrief ings are thorough (2)
.
b. Question to AMC
List 3 strengths of the Army debriefing process.
1. Discussion
Twenty one (21) contracting officers answered
this question. Many strengths of the debriefing process were
identified by the contracting officers. The major themes from
these strengths follow:
• Debriefings provide an opportunity for contracting
officers to give information to unsuccessful offerors that
will strengthen their future proposals (8)
.
• Debriefings are given in a timely manner (4)
.
• Debriefings show the fairness and integrity of the source
selection process (6)
.
• Debriefings add accountability to the evaluation process
(l) .
• Debriefings answer all questions relative to the offeror's
proposal (1)
.
• Debriefings reveal the strengths and weaknesses of the
offeror's proposal (5).
• Debriefings give a lot of details to the unsuccessful
offeror regarding the evaluation of his proposal (4)
.
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Contracting officers are willing to discuss all issues
pertinent to the evaluation of the proposal (1)
.
Debrief ings explain the basis for the award (1)
c. Analysis
The survey results show that unsuccessful offerors
and contracting officers believe there are many strengths to
the debriefing process. All the items given as strengths
should benefit the debriefing process. The majority of the
strengths listed were mentioned by four or fewer survey
participants. This could indicate that debrief ings are
conducted somewhat differently by different commands and
contracting officers and that the parties involved in the
debriefing process have differences of opinion concerning what
is important to the debriefing process.
25. Question 25 This question was designed to identify
the weaknesses of the debriefing process. Once these
weaknesses are identified steps can be taken to correct these
problems. This will improve the debriefing process.
a. Question to unsuccessful offerors
List 3 weaknesses of the Army debriefing process
1. Discussion
Thirty (30) unsuccessful offerors answered
this question. Many weaknesses were listed. The major themes
of the weaknesses follow:
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• Debrief ings are not done in a timely manner (5)
.
• Debrief ings do not provide enough details (9)
.
• Personnel who debrief are very cautious in what they say
(4) .
• Limited information is given out due to the restrictions
imposed by the regulations (6)
.
• Debriefings offer very little information useful for
future proposals (3).
• No information is given on the awardee's proposal (3)
.
• The main players in the source selection are sometimes not
in attendance (2)
.
b. Question to AMC
List 3 weaknesses of the Army debriefing process.
1. Discussion
Seventeen (17) contracting officers answered
this question. They stated there were many weaknesses in the
debriefing process. The major weaknesses they indicated
follow:
• Comparisons of proposals must be done to make the
debriefing meaningful (3)
.
• There are limits on the release of information due to the
regulations (2)
.
• Debriefing can't cover any aspects of the winner's
proposal except his total price (2)
.
• Fear of protests causes contracting officers to control




• Key players in the source selection process are sometimes
not available for the debriefing (1)
.
• Often more is revealed in a debriefing than is required
(1) .
c. Analysis
The research shows there are several weaknesses to
the debriefing process. Every one of the items identified as
a weakness should have an adverse impact on the debriefing
process. All but two of the weaknesses given involved the
lack of information given out in debrief ings. This indicates
that a major deficiency with the debriefing process is the
lack of information released to unsuccessful offerors.
26. Question 2 6
a. Question to unsuccessful offerors The intent of
this question is to determine if unsuccessful offerors ask a
core set of similar questions at debrief ings. If they do,
contracting officers can prepare for these questions and
unsuccessful offerors may then get better answers to these
common questions.




Thirty three (33) unsuccessful offerors
answered this question. A total of 74 questions were given.
Many respondents listed only one or two questions for their
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answer. Questions that were listed at least three times are
considered common questions. The following nine questions
appeared at least three times.
• What was the evaluation of our technical approach (12)?
• What are the weaknesses in our proposal (8)?
• What was the evaluation of our cost (8)?
• What was the winner's proposal and evaluation of that
proposal (6)
?
• How did we compare with the awardee (5)?
• What are the strengths of our proposal (4)?
• How did the evaluators judge our risk (3)?
• What was our overall ranking (3)?
• What should have I done to have won this competition (3)?
2 . Analysis
There are many similar questions that are
asked by unsuccessful offerors during debrief ings. One of
these questions cannot be answered according to the guidance
in the AFARS and another question can only be answered in a
very general nature in accordance with the FAR. The AFARS
states that comparisons will not be made between proposals [1:
p. 10 -3]. Therefore unsuccessful offerors will not get an
answer to their question of how did they compare to the winner
unless the contracting officer deviates from the AFARS
guidance. The FAR states that debrief ings will not reveal the
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relative merits or information covered by the Freedom of
Information Act on competitors proposals [7: p. 15-41]. This
will severely limit what can be discussed in response to the
question what was the winner's proposal and evaluation of that
proposal. The other questions can be thoroughly answered by
debriefing personnel. Contracting officers that are prepared
to answer these questions will give better answers to these
questions than those who are not ready to answer them.
c. Question to AMC This question was designed to
determine if AMC MSC's have internal instructions that give
guidance to contracting officers on debriefing unsuccessful
offerors.





Thirty one (31) contracting officers answered
this question. Forty five (45) percent stated that their
organization has internal instructions covering debriefing
procedures. Fifty five (55) percent of the contracting
officers responded their command doesn't have internal
instructions on debriefing procedures.
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2 . Analysis
Results of this question show that not all
commands have guidance for debriefing unsuccessful offerors.
Lack of any clear guidance as to what may be covered in a
debriefing and what may not can cause contracting officers to
take a very conservative view of the general guidance in the
FAR and AFARS . Follow up telephone calls to the five MSC's
surveyed revealed that three MSC's have written guidance
concerning debrief ings. Only one of these has any specific
guidelines. This MSC's internal instructions has several
recommendations for what should be covered in a debriefing.
It states that the contractor officer should consider the
following items in the debriefing: a general explanation of
the source selection organization, the basis for the award,
the ratings the offeror's proposal received on all the factors
and sub- factors, an explanation of why each rating was given,
the advantages and disadvantages of the proposal , and a brief
explanation of why the successful offeror won. The
explanation of why the winner won could include showing the
winner's ratings for each factor and sub-factor without any
detailed explanation of each rating. This guidance adds some
structure to the debriefing process. It also provides some
framework for what can be discussed about the winner's
proposal evaluation. This can add valuable information to the
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debriefing, as the unsuccessful offeror can see where his
proposal stood in relation to the winner's in terms of the
overall rating for each area. The guidance this MSC's
internal instructions provide allow contracting officers who
have interpreted the FAR and AFARS conservatively to give
information that they may not have given absent this guidance.
27 . Question 27 The intent of this question was to have
both the unsuccessful offerors and contracting officers offer
their ideas on things the Army could do to improve the
debriefing process.
a. Question to unsuccessful offerors
The Army could improve the debriefing process
by •
1. Discussion
Twenty eight (28) unsuccessful offerors
answered this question. Many proposals were provided to
improve the debriefing process. The major themes of these
proposals follow:
• Allow some comparisons with the winning proposal (7)
.
• Improve evaluation process so that the people debriefing
can give an honest and detailed debriefing (5)
.
• Be more specific when discussing deficiencies (4)
.
• Provide more information on winning proposal (4)
.
• Approach process in a more positive way (3)
.
• Provide read ahead packets (2)
.
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Debrief ings should be done in a more timely manner (2)
.
Discuss strengths as well as weaknesses (2)
.
Allow contractors to submit questions before debriefing so
answers can be better researched (1)
.
Reveal how unsuccessful offeror ranked in all areas
(1) .
Provide rating and risk assessment for each evaluated area
for both the unsuccessful offeror's and winner's proposal
(1).
Release SSA decision document (1)
.
b. Question to AMC
I/The Army could improve the debriefing process by
1. Discussion
Twenty two (22) contracting officers answered
the question. Many answers were given. The major themes for
improving the debriefing process follow:
• Issue some direction other than what is in the FAR (4)
.
• Write solicitations and evaluation criteria as precise as
possible to make evaluations and subsequent debriefings
easier (2)
.
• Ask for questions in advance (1)
.
• Give unsuccessful offerors their evaluation ratings
(1) .
• Establish guidelines for consistency of releasable
information (1) .
• Allow comparisons between unsuccessful offeror's proposal
and winning proposal (2)
.
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• Give unsuccessful offerors debriefing charts in advance of
the debriefing (1) .
• Provide maximum information allowed (3)
.
• Contracting officers should be more open and honest
(1) .
• Give unsuccessful offerors source selection decision
memorandum (1)
.
• Hold debriefings later than they are now held (2)
.
c. Analysis
The results of the research show there are many
ways that contracting officers and AMC could improve the
debriefing process. Several of the recommended ways to
improve debriefings were mentioned by both unsuccessful
offerors and AMC officials. These areas were allowing some
comparisons with the winning proposal, give out debriefing
packets and do so before the debriefing, provide offerors with
their ratings for the evaluated areas, provide as much
information as possible, and releasing the source selection
decision document. One recommendation that the two survey
groups disagreed on was when to conduct debriefings.
Contractors stated that the debriefing process could be
improved by holding debriefings in a more timely manner while
AMC officials said to improve the debriefings they should be
held later than they are now held.
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28. Question 28. This question was designed to get
recommendations from unsuccessful offerors and contracting
officers of how unsuccessful offerors could improve the
debriefing process.
a. Question to unsuccessful offerors




Twenty four (24) unsuccessful offerors
answered this question. The major themes of their proposals
follow:
• Submit questions before the debriefing (7)
.
• Have the right personnel there (3)
.
• Approach the debriefing with a positive attitude (5)
.
• Limit protests to procurements that show a clear
impropriety or prejudice (2)
.
• Ask as many questions as needed but ensure they are
relevant and appropriate (6)
b. Question to AMC




Twenty one (21) contracting officers answered
the question. Several themes were given as possible ways to
improve the system:
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• Accept source selection and don't protest unless
impartiality is displayed (3)
.
• Be receptive rather than defensive (2)
.
• Don't challenge the source selection decision (3).
• Personnel in attendance should have a good understanding
of evaluation factors and proposal (2)
• Unsuccessful offerors should ask questions in advance
(2) .
• Unsuccessful offerors should ensure their decision makers
for technical and cost areas are in attendance (3)
.
• Unsuccessful offerors should be familiar with regulatory
restrictions concerning debrief ings (1)
.
• Unsuccessful offerors should not be so emotional (2)
.
c. Analysis
The results of the survey indicate there are
several ways that unsuccessful offerors could improve the
debriefing process. Four of these recommendations were made
by both groups of respondents. They are: submit questions
before the debriefing, have the right personnel attend the
debriefing, approach the debriefing with the right frame of
mind, and limit protests to procurements that show a clear
impropriety or unfairness in the source selection process.
Two of these recommendations could be difficult for all
contractors to execute. Approaching a debriefing with the
right frame of mind by being receptive rather than defensive
and accepting, not challenging the source selection can be
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hard to do. It is natural for a contractor to be defensive
when his proposal was not selected as the winning proposal and
then attend a debriefing where someone tells him all the
things that were wrong with the proposal. It is also natural
for contractors to think they submitted the best proposal and
the only way they could have lost was if the source selection
team somehow made a mistake.
C. INTERVIEWS
1 . General
Interviews were done with defense contractors and
contacting officers as a follow up to the surveys. The
interviews were done with three defense contractors to get
their opinions on how the debriefing process could be
improved. These interview participants included a large
hardware company, a large services company and a small
hardware company. The intent of the interviews was to have a
discussion and ask questions to illicit responses on how to
improve the debriefing process that may have been missed by
the survey participants. Contracting officers from three
MSC's within AMC were then interviewed to get their opinions
on the feasibility of implementing the major suggested changes
to the debriefing process.
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2. Interview Results
The three defense contractors suggested a total of 19
changes to the current debriefing process that they felt would
improve debrief ings. All but four of these changes were
identified by the survey participants. The contracting
officers that were interviewed believe 14 of these
recommendations could be implemented.
Recommendations which were identified in both the
surveys and interviews that would improve the debriefing
process are:
• Debrief ings should be done in a timely manner.
• AMC MSC's should not place any limits on the employees
that may attend the debriefing from the unsuccessful
offerors.
• Contracting officers should debrief in an outline similar
to the RFP.
• Contracting officers should give unsuccessful offerors a
debriefing packet and do so before the debrief if
possible.
• Unsuccessful offerors should submit questions in advance
of the debriefing.
• SSEB members and any other evaluators should be in
attendance at the debriefing to participate in the debrief
and answer questions.
• Debrief ings should cover both the strengths and weaknesses
of the offeror's proposal.
• Debriefings should cover the ratings of the evaluated
areas for both the offeror's and winner's proposals.
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• Narrative comments should cover all evaluated areas and be
specific.
• General details of the winner's proposal evaluation should
be discussed.
• Some comparisons between unsuccessful offeror's and
winner's proposals should be revealed.
• Contracting officers should discuss the basis for the
award decision.
• Some of the restrictions that the regulations stipulate
concerning what shouldn't be revealed in debrief ings
should be lifted.
• Specific guidance on what should and shouldn't be covered
in debrief ings should be developed.
• The SSA decision document should be released to
unsuccessful offerors.
Contracting officers believe that several of these
recommendations are not feasible. They believe that handouts
should be given out to the unsuccessful offerors. This will
allow the offerors to listen more closely to the debrief
rather than trying to write down what they hear and see.
However it would be difficult to give these handouts to the
unsuccessful offerors before the debriefing if the debrief ings
are conducted soon after the contract award. Some time is
needed to prepare handouts for all the unsuccessful offerors
and there would not be enough time to prepare all these
handouts far enough in advance to send them to the offerors
[22] .
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Next, contracting officers believe that ratings for
the winner's proposal should not be given out in the
debriefing [21]. They feel that discussing the winner's
ratings would provide too much information on the winner's
proposal
.
Providing the general details of the winner's proposal
evaluation to the unsuccessful offeror's is inappropriate
according to contracting officers [22.] . Some details on the
winner's cost or price can be released but this is the only
information that should be released. Contracting officers
further stated that if unsuccessful offeror's want any
additional information on the winner's proposal they should
request it under the Freedom of Information Act [2_1] .
Finally, contracting officers interviewed believe that
specific guidance on what should and shouldn't be covered in
debrief ings should not be developed. They feel they have the
latitude to work within the spirit of the regulations to
tailor debrief ings as needed depending on the situation [21]
.
The remaining four recommendations were identified in
the interviews only. The first of these recommendations is
that debriefings should be offered to all unsuccessful
offerors [14] . Offering a debriefing shows courtesy to the
unsuccessful offeror. The contractor spent precious resources
on the proposal and offering to debrief him shows the
115
contracting command appreciates the offeror's attempt to do
business with the command. Additionally the offer to debrief
all offerors shows the contractors that the contracting
officer has nothing to hide and that the source selection was
done properly. Finally, offering a debriefing to all
unsuccessful offerors will ensure that those contractors who
are unaware that they are entitled to a debriefing know they
can receive one. There is nothing that prevents contracting
officers from offering to debrief all unsuccessful offerors
and some contracting officers already do this [21]
.
Debriefing all evaluated areas would also improve the
debriefing process [13.] . A debriefing that covers all
evaluated areas allows the unsuccessful offeror to understand
where his proposal stood in relation to all evaluation
criteria. This type of debriefing would be superior to one
where the offeror was only debriefed in certain areas that he
was particularly weak in, as covering all areas would provide
a broader base of information about the entire proposal.
Another defense contractor stated that not only should
each evaluated area in the debrief be discussed but the sub-
factors in each area should be briefed [13.] . Debrief ings that
address each sub- factor area should be much more informative
than debriefings that address only evaluation factors or
general areas. Offerors would get an understanding of how
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their proposal stood up to the evaluation criteria on a much
more specific basis.
Revealing the rankings for each evaluated area for
both the unsuccessful offeror's and winner's proposals would
also improve the debriefing process [14] . This would allow
contractors to see where they stood in relation to the other
offerors and the winner. This information cannot be released
for technical areas, however, according to the FAR [7: p. 15-
41] . Additionally giving out this information for other areas
could be considered making point by point comparisons, which
the AFARS prohibits. Revealing the rankings for the
unsuccessful offeror's and winner's evaluated areas would be
inappropriate according to contracting officers. Contracting
officers stated this would be providing point by point
comparisons which is prohibited by the AFARS [22]
.
D. SUMMARY
1. Debrief ings within AMC
The results of the survey provide an overview of what
a debriefing is like within AMC. However, as the survey
results show no two debrief ings are exactly the same. There
are too many variables that can be changed to effect the
debriefing process. These variables include things such as
who the contracting officer is, the size and type of
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procurement, the number and complexity of evaluation criteria
used, the detail of the evaluation, the experience of the
personnel involved, and the concerns and questions of the
unsuccessful offerors. This section summarizes the answers to
the survey which show what a generic debriefing of an
unsuccessful offeror is within AMC. It will discuss when and
where done, who attends, and what is discussed. Because no
two debrief ings are the same, debrief ings within AMC may vary
somewhat from the following baseline description.
Debriefings must be conducted for those unsuccessful
offerors that request a debriefing in writing. This is in
accordance with the FAR. The number of unsuccessful offerors
that request a debriefing is generally quite high. More than
two thirds request a debriefing with this number being even
higher for major acquisitions or best value type procurements.
In addition, many contracting officers offer to debrief the
unsuccessful offerors even if the offeror does not ask for a
debriefing. This is not required by any regulation but is
done out of courtesy for the unsuccessful offerors. Many
contractors will accept this offer of a debrief. This
increases the percentage of contractors being debriefed to a
number higher than those that would have been debriefed from
a contractor initiated request.
118
Two regulations provide guidance on when debriefings
will be conducted. The FAR states that offerors will be
debriefed as soon as possible after their request. AMC P 715-
3 Vol. 1 states that debriefings will be held after contract
award [2: p. 51] . Contracting officers hold debriefings as
soon as possible after their request. Contracting officers
report this is usually within ten days of the request.
Unsuccessful offerors dispute this and report that as the
majority say debriefings are held between 11 and 20 days of
request.
There is no written guidance on where debriefings are
to be held. However, most debriefings are in person and it is
standard practice that debriefings are held at the contracting
officer's command. If the contractor wants to attend a
debriefing it is incumbent on him to travel to the contracting
officer's location. Sometimes a telephone debriefing may be
conducted but this is done only at the unsuccessful offeror's
direction. Debriefing by phone is normally done when the
contract is small or the debriefing is easily understandable
by phone. In these cases it is not cost effective for a
contractor to pay travel costs to attend an in person
debriefing.
The number of people who attend the debriefing is
dependent on the size and complexity of the procurement. For
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large or complex procurements representatives of AMC may
include the source selection evaluation board chairman, the
factor chairmen, the contracting officer, contracting
specialist, and a legal representative. Any other special
support personnel are added as needed. Representatives from
the unsuccessful firm that may attend a debriefing for large
or complex procurements may include the vice president,
program manager, proposal manager, and contracts manager. For
smaller or less complex procurements there would generally be
fewer personnel from each side participating. This could go
all the way done to a one on one situation where the
contracting officer debriefs a contracting official from the
unsuccessful firm.
The debriefing may be conducted by the contracting
official alone or he may be joined by other personnel,
especially for large procurements. For these large
procurement debrief ings the contracting officer is responsible
for the set up and organization of the debriefing. He or the
source selection evaluation board chairman is usually the
official that conducts the introduction and general portions
of the debriefing. The source selection evaluation board
factor chairmen or representatives will conduct a debrief on
their portion of the source selection and answer any related
questions.
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The information that is given out in the debriefing is
the most important aspect of the debriefing. Obtaining this
information is, of course, why the unsuccessful offerors ask
for the debriefing. They generally look for as much
information as they can get to understand why they didn't win
the contract award. Most AMC officials say they debrief in
accordance with the RFP, although the high percentage that say
they do is disputed by the unsuccessful offerors. The
debriefing will address the technical, management and cost
merits of the proposal and in most cases identify weaknesses
in the offeror's proposal. Debriefing officials may sometimes
discuss the winner's proposal, but only in very general terms.
Details of the winning proposal are not disclosed nor are
comparisons made between the offeror's proposal and other
offerors' proposals, to include the winner's proposal. In
addition, proprietary business data from other offerors is
never discussed.
The unsuccessful offeror is permitted to ask questions
at the debriefing. Questions pertaining to the offeror's
proposal are answered, although detailed or difficult
questions may result in an answer being provided sometime
after the conclusion of the debriefing. Questions pertaining
to another offeror's proposal are normally not answered. They
may be answered if they are of only a very general nature,
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result in no point by point comparisons and don't involve
proprietary business information.
2. Major Items Identified To Improve Debriefing Process
The research shows there are many areas of the
debriefing process that can be improved. Many areas for
improvement have been mentioned several times by the
respondents throughout the research effort. These areas are
summarized here.
• Debrief ings should be conducted in a timely manner.
• No limits should be placed on who the unsuccessful
offerors send to debrief ings.
• Contracting officers should debrief in an outline similar
to the RFP.
• Debriefing packets should be provided to unsuccessful
offerors and the packets should be given to them before
the debriefing if possible.
• Unsuccessful offerors should submit questions before the
debriefing is conducted.
• SSEB members and other evaluators should be available to
participate in the debriefing.
• The strengths as well as the weaknesses of the offeror's
proposal should be covered in debrief ings.
• The ratings of the offeror's and winner's proposal
evaluations should be disclosed.
• Narrative comments should be specific and be given for all
evaluated areas
.
• General comments on the winner's proposal evaluation
should be discussed.
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• Some comparisons should be made between the winner's and
unsuccessful offeror's proposals.
• The basis for the award decision should be revealed.
• Some regulatory restrictions should be lifted.
• Specific guidance should be developed which covers what
should and shouldn't be discussed in debrief ings.
• Contracting officers should release the source selection
decision document to unsuccessful offerors.
• Contracting officers should offer to debrief all
unsuccessful offerors.
• Contracting officers should debrief all evaluated
areas
.
• Debrief ings should be done down to the sub- factor
level.
• Contracting officers should discuss the evaluation
rankings for the unsuccessful offeror and winner.
E. SUMMARY
This chapter presented and analyzed the data obtained from
the surveys and interviews conducted. The research showed
there is no standard debriefing process but debriefings are
dependent on several factors. The research also showed that
there are many ways the debriefing process can be improved.
Chapter V will present conclusions, make recommendations to
improve the debriefing process, answer the research questions
and make recommendations for further research.
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. GENERAL
There are several conclusions that can be made on the
current debriefing process based on the discussion and
analysis of the research done. Many recommendations can be
made to improve the current debriefing process. This chapter
will address the conclusions and recommendations on the
debriefing process, answer the research questions and point
out areas for further research.
B. CONCLUSIONS
There are three conclusions that can be made based on the
research done.
1. Debriefings are not standard
The survey data shows that debrief ings within AMC,
although somewhat similar, are not standard. Rather
debrief ings are directly influenced by a variety of factors.
The main factors include the command and contracting officer





Current debriefing process is working
The current debriefing process is working. The
research shows that respondents get some value out of
conducting and attending debrief ings. However, the
respondents feel that the current debriefing process is not
working as well as it could and improvements could be made to
the debriefing process.
3 . Improvements can be made to the current process
The research shows that there are many changes that
can be made to the current debriefing process that can improve
debrief ings. Changes can be made by both unsuccessful
offerors and contracting officers to improve the process.
These changes can be made to the set up and format of the
debrief ings and also the debriefing content.
C . RECOMMENDATIONS
There are 13 recommendations that can be made based on the
research done.
1. Offer debriefings to all unsuccessful offerors
Contracting officers should offer debriefings to all
unsuccessful offerors. At the point in the procurement
process where the debriefing takes place the contracting
officer is providing a service to the unsuccessful offerors.
To provide this service to the maximum number of contractors
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it would be best to offer debriefings to all unsuccessful
offerors. The regulations do not require AMC to offer
debriefings to anyone. They only state that debriefings must
be given to those offerors that request a debriefing in
writing. However offering debriefings to all unsuccessful
offerors will ensure that contractors unaware of their chance
to be debriefed or contractors who are unsure if they can get
a debriefing in certain procurements, know they may be
debriefed. Additionally, offering to debrief unsuccessful
offerors shows courtesy for the efforts of all contractors
attempting to win the contract award. Offering debriefings
also shows that the contracting command has nothing to hide
and that the source selection was done rationally and in
accordance with the RFP.
2 . Debriefings should be timely
Debriefings should be done in a timely manner. The
results of the research show that 50% of all respondents
believe debriefings should be done within 10 days after
contract award. Therefore a timely debriefing can be
considered one that is done within 10 days after contract
award. Timely debriefings offer several benefits. First
there is a better chance that SSEB members and other
evaluators who can enhance the quality of the debriefing will
be able to participate in the debriefing. The longer the time
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period between the contract award and the debriefing the more
likely it is that these personnel will have gone on to other
business and thus not be available for the debriefing.
Additionally, contractor personnel can get on with other
business quicker when the debriefing is done in a timely
manner. Debriefings that are done quickly can also boost the
confidence that unsuccessful offerors have in the source
selection process. By providing timely debrief ings AMC
officials show that they are organized, professional, and can
debrief from the source selection evaluation documentation
without needing extra time to prepare additional data to
justify the contract award or proposal evaluation. Conducting
debriefings as soon as possible and possibly even pre-
scheduling them indicates that AMC officials believe
debriefings are an important part of the source selection
process and not just a necessary evil. Timely debriefings may
also reduce the number of protests that are filed. A
competent debriefing done within the 10 day protest window
after contract award should show the contractor that his
proposal received a fair evaluation and that the source
selection decision was proper. A debriefing that is not done
until after this window closes may prompt a protest before the
protest window closes if the contractor has any doubts about
the fairness of the selection decision. A source selection
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that is protested is harder to debrief and provides less
information than one that is not protested as the personnel
doing the debriefing would be much more conservative with
regard to what information they release.
3. Place no limits on who may attend debriefings
Contracting commands should not place any limits on
who the unsuccessful offerors may send to debrief ings. The
unsuccessful offeror is in the best position to determine who
he needs to send to the debriefing to get the information he
desires. Placing limits on the number of personnel or type of
employees he may send can have an adverse impact on what the
contractor extracts from the debriefing. Placing limits on
who can attend can also invite unwarranted conclusions from
the unsuccessful offeror. He may feel that the contracting
command is trying to hide something by limiting who may attend
or he may feel that he would have gotten more from the
debriefing if he could have sent all the personnel he wanted
to send. AMC officials need to keep the debriefing process as
credible as possible and allowing contractors to send who they
want to send to the debriefing helps in this regard. Thus,
AMC personnel should fight to overcome any obstacles that may




4. Give contractors debriefing packets
Contracting officers should give unsuccessful offerors
debriefing packets and provide them before the debriefing if
possible. Debriefing packets would improve the debriefing in
several ways. First, contractors could shift their attention
from the distracting task of copying charts and slides and
taking notes to listening to the content of the debriefing and
taking a few notes. Additionally, the unsuccessful offeror's
contracting officials will have an official record of the
debriefing from which they can, in turn, debrief their
superiors. They can also use it to refer to later if
questions arise concerning the debriefing. Next, if the
debriefing packet is given to the contractor before the
debriefing it would allow the contractor to prepare for the
debriefing. They could study the advance material and tailor
their interest and questions to areas they don't understand or
agree with. Contractors could also tailor who they send to
the debriefing based on the advance material they get.
5. Evaluators should participate in debriefings
The SSEB members and any other evaluators should
participate in the debrief ings. They have the expertise and
intimate knowledge of the proposal evaluation to best debrief
or answer questions in their respective evaluation areas.
Debriefings can be much more informative when evaluators are
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available to participate in the debriefing. Since contracting
officers do not have the same level of expertise or knowledge
about the proposal evaluation, debrief ings done solely by the
contracting officer tend to be dry and uninformative and in
many cases scripted. Additionally, the contracting officer
would be hard pressed to give any data other than what is in
the script as he would not have the capability to provide any
more information. Therefore in an attempt to give as much
information as possible to the unsuccessful offeror it is best
to have the evaluation team available to participate in the
debriefing.
6. Submit questions before debriefings
Unsuccessful offerors should submit questions before
the debrief ings are conducted. This will allow contracting
officers to properly research these questions, prepare
satisfactory answers and present these answers in the
debriefing. This will reduce the problem of asking a question
during the debriefing and not getting an adequate answer
because there was not enough time to gather the necessary
information and prepare the answer.
7. Brief in an outline similar to RFP
The debriefing should be done in an outline similar to
the RFP. Interview results show that a debriefing done in an
outline similar to the RFP is easier to follow. The
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contractor can go right down the RFP and his proposal as it is
debriefed and follow the debriefing rather than flipping
pages trying to stay with a debriefing that skips around.
Additionally, according to one contracting officer, using an
outline similar to the RFP makes it easier for the contracting
officer to put together and format the debriefing while
ensuring all relevant areas are covered.
8. Cover strengths and weaknesses
Debriefings should cover the strengths as well as the
weaknesses of the offeror's proposal. Not only is it
important to discuss where the unsuccessful offeror's
weaknesses are in their proposal but it is also important to
discuss their strengths. Revealing the offeror's strengths
will let the contractor know where the contracting command
believes the offeror is particularly strong. This will allow
the contractor to not waste resources by making unnecessary
modifications to his strengths and to capitalize on these
strengths in future proposals.
9. Give the offeror his ratings
Contracting officers should give the unsuccessful
offerors their ratings for each of the evaluated areas. The
ratings, combined with good narrative comments, will give
offerors a better understanding of how their proposal stood up
to the evaluation compared to a debriefing where just comments
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are given out. As an example an evaluated area that has three
positive comments and one negative comment with a rating of
outstanding would indicate that the offeror was strong in that
area. The same comments with no rating would leave the
offeror with a question of how strong his proposal was in that
area.
10. Debriefing should cover all evaluated areas
The debriefing should cover all evaluated areas.
Unsuccessful offerors should receive a better briefing if all
evaluated areas are covered in the debriefing. The
contracting officer and others who debrief are familiar with
all evaluated areas and have the evaluation comments at their
disposal. They should pass on their evaluation remarks for
all areas. Telling an unsuccessful offeror that he was
satisfactory in an area and then following up with any
comments noted from the evaluation is more informative than
bypassing satisfactory areas and leaving it up to the
contractor to guess how he did in the bypassed areas.
11. Debrief down to sub -factor level
Not only should personnel conducting the debriefing
brief each evaluated area but they should brief down to the
sub- factor level. In order to be specific enough for the
remarks to be helpful and informative the debriefing should go
to this level. A common complaint from the unsuccessful
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offerors is that debriefings are too generic in nature.
Briefing down to the sub- factor level with good narrative
comments will help alleviate this problem.
12. Use the latitude authorized to deviate from AFARS
when in best interests of parties involved
Contracting officers should use the latitude they have
to deviate from the strict guidance of the AFARS when it is in
the best interests of AMC to do so. A conservative
interpretation of the AFARS is that no information should be
given out on any competitor's proposal or evaluation of their
proposals and that no comparisons will be made between
proposals . The research has shown that the authors of the
AFARS intended to allow contracting commands to deviate from
the guidance of the AFARS when it made sense to do so.
Additionally, several commands routinely deviate from this
guidance to get as much information to the unsuccessful
offerors as they can. This includes giving out general
details of the winner's proposal and the evaluation done on it
and making some general comparisons between the winner's and
unsuccessful offeror's proposals. This additional information
will help the unsuccessful offerors understand how their




13 . Release the SSA decision document
Contracting officers should release the SSA decision
document to unsuccessful offerors during the debriefing.
Research has shown that releasing this document to
unsuccessful offerors provides contractors with information
they clearly want and is useful to them. It has also shown to
add credibility to the source selection process in the eyes of
the contractors. The document must be scrubbed to ensure any
confidential business data is deleted and that any items
expressly prohibited by the FAR are not included in the
document that is released. This document should show the
basis for the award decision. Items that could be released in
this document include the ratings for each area for the
winner's and offeror's proposals, some general comparisons and
why the decision was made. Comments such as the following
would be useful: Company A' s proposal was good but not as
advantageous to the Army as company B's proposal. Company B
was slightly better than company A in the technical area.
Company A was better in the area of past performance. Company
B was slightly better in the management area than company A.
Company B's advantages in the technical area and management
more than offset company A' s advantage in past performance
therefore company B was chosen for the contract award.
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D. ANSWERS TO RESEARCH QUESTIONS
1. Primary. What are the key problems and issues
associated with AMC's process of debriefing unsuccessful
offerors and what can be done to improve the process?
Key problems with the debriefing process include
debriefings not being done in a timely manner, key personnel
from AMC not attending the debriefing, limits being placed on
who may attend debrief ings from unsuccessful firms, and
limited information being given out in the debrief ings.
The process can be improved by offering debrief ings to all
unsuccessful offerors, conducting debriefings in a timely
manner, not limiting who may attend debrief ings, providing
unsuccessful offerors with debriefing packets, and providing
more information to the unsuccessful offerors.
2. Subsidiary.
a) What is the current debriefing process used by
AMC?
There is no standard debriefing process used by
AMC. Rather AMC MSC's and contracting officers tailor
debriefings based on the guidance in the FAR, AFARS, internal
operating instructions and situation.
There are some generic procedures for AMC
debrief ings however. Debriefings must be conducted for all
unsuccessful offerors that ask for a debriefing in writing.
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The debriefings are held at the contracting command and
several people representing the contractor and contracting
command normally attend the debriefing. The contracting
command will provide the unsuccessful offeror with information
that will help the offeror determine how their proposal stood
up to the evaluation criteria and why they did not win the
contract award.
b) What are the problems associated with AMC's
current debriefing process from AMC's perspective?
Several problems were identified with the
debriefing process according to AMC contracting officers.
First, sometimes the key players in the source selection
process are not available to participate in the debriefing.
Next, limited information is put out in the debriefing. Many
debriefings do not cover all evaluated areas, give narrative
comments for all areas, reveal ratings for the offeror's
evaluated areas, make any comments about the winner's
proposal, and make any comparisons between the winner's and
offeror's proposals. Additionally debriefings are, at times,
not timely.
c) What are the problems associated with AMC's
current debriefing process from the unsuccessful offeror's
perspective?
13 6
There are many problems with the debriefing
process according to unsuccessful offerors. Debriefings are
not done in a timely manner and do not provide enough details.
Information is limited due to restrictions imposed by the
regulations. Little or no information is given out on the
winner's proposal. Sometimes the main players in the source
selection process are not in attendance at the debrief ings.
d) How can the debriefing process be modified to help
AMC and the unsuccessful offerors?
There are several ways to modify the debriefing
process to help the parties involved. Debrief ings should be
offered to all unsuccessful offerors. Debrief ings should be
done in a timely manner and there should be no limits placed
on who may attend the debrief ings. Contracting commands
should give unsuccessful offerors debriefing packets and
evaluators should participate in the debrief ings.
Unsuccessful offerors should submit questions before the
debriefing. The debriefing should be conducted in an outline
similar to the RFP. More information should be given out in
the debrief ings. This includes debriefing the offeror's
strengths and weaknesses, giving the offeror his ratings,
covering all evaluated areas and debriefing down to the sub-
factor level and releasing the SSA decision document.
Contracting officers should also use the latitude they have to
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deviate from the strict guidance of the AFARS when it is in
the best interests of the parties involved.
E. AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
An area for further research can be to look at the
debriefing process by contractor commodity type, ie. hardware,
software, services, and compare these commodity types to see
if the contractors in each type face the same problems with
debriefings or if debriefings in different commodities have
different limitations. Another approach to take with further
resea i could be to research debriefings by large and small




SURVEY FOR UNSUCCESSFUL OFFERORS CONCERNING ARMY DEBRIEFING
1. When not awarded a contract I request a debriefing
a. more than 2/3 's of the time.
b. between 1/3 and 2/3 's of the time.
c. less than 1/3 of the time.
Comments:








4. The Army limits the number of employees that may attend







5. The Army limits the employees, by job position, that may










c. more than 20
Comments:
7. Debrief ings should be conducted within calendar
days after contract award.
Comments
:
8. normally debriefs me.
a. the contracting officer
b. source selection evaluation board chairman
c. a combination of both
d. other
Comments:
9. Debrief ings are normally held
a. at my location.





a. doesn't allow questions.
b. allows and answers all questions.
c. allows and answers some questions.
Comments
11. If the Army doesn't answer some of my questions it is
because
a. they can't answer them due to regulations or
confidential/proprietary business information.





d. not applicable, they answer all my questions.
Comments
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12. Debriefings normally consist of
a. limited information, because
b. as much information as the Army can give in accordance




13. The Army would provide more information if the possible






don ' t know
Comments:











16. The Army debriefs me on the merits of my







17. I am satisfied with the debriefing on the technical,








18. Debrief ings give me information that leads to more








19. Upon conclusion of a debrief, I completely understood why
my company did not win the contract award,
a. always
b. sometimes
c. never, why not_
Comments
20. The debrief ings are to my company,
a. valuable
b. somewhat valuable
c. not at all valuable
Comments:






22. Debrief ings should address (circle all that apply)
, as long as confidential business information is
not disclosed.
a. the basic proposed technical solution of the awardee
b. the overall evaluated cost of the awardee and debriefed
offeror
c. cost or price associated with the major components of
the awardee 's proposal
d. overall ranking and total evaluation scores of the
awardee and debriefed offeror
e. technical point scores of the awardee and debriefed
offeror












24. List 3 strengths of the Army debriefing process
25. List 3 weaknesses of the Army debriefing process.
26. The 3 most common questions I ask during a debriefing
27. The Army could improve the debriefing process by
28. I/unsuccessful offerors could improve the debriefing
process by
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SURVEY FOR AMC CONTRACTING OFFICERS CONCERNING DEBRIEFINGS
1. How many unsuccessful offerors ask for a debriefing?
a. less than 1/3
b. between 1/3 and 2/3
c. more than 2/3
Comments
:




3. The following personnel (by job title) from my
organization attend the debriefing
Comments
4. I limit the number of employees that unsuccessful offerors







5. I limit employees, by job title, that unsuccessful












c. more than 20
Comments
7. Debrief ings should be conducted within calendar
days after contract award.
Comments
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8. Debriefings are conducted by (Give job title)
Comments
:
9 . Debriefings are normally held
a. at my location





a. don't allow questions
b. allow and answer all questions
c. allow and answer some questions
Comments:
11. If I don't answer some of the unsuccessful offerors
questions it is because
a. I can't answer them due to regulations or
confidential/proprietary business information
b. I won't answer them due to a possible protest
c. other
d. n/a, I answer all questions
Comments
12. Debriefings normally consist of
a. limited information, because
b. as much information as I can give in accordance with
the regulations and confidential/proprietary business
information
Comments:
13. I would provide more information if the possible threat























16. I debrief unsuccessful offerors on the merits of






17. Unsuccessful offerors are satisfied with the debriefing






d don ' t know
Comments
18. Debrief ings give unsuccessful offerors information that





d don ' t know
Comments
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19 . Upon conclusion of a debrief the unsuccessful offeror






d don ' t know
Comments:





c. not at all valuable
Comments
:
21. My organization offers to debrief all unsuccessful





22. Debriefings should address (circle all that apply)
,
as long as confidential business
information is not disclosed.
a. the basic proposed technical solution of the awardee
b. the overall evaluated cost of the awardee and debriefed
offeror
c. cost or price associated with the major components of
the awardee 's proposal
d. overall ranking and total evaluation scores of the
awardee and debriefed offeror




none of the above
g. other
Comments
23. The sooner a debriefing is conducted, the more likely it














25. List 3 strengths of the Army debriefing process
26. List 3 weaknesses of the Army debriefing process
27. I/The Army could improve the debriefing process by
28. Unsuccessful offerors could improve the debriefing by
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